Oil Pollution Problems Arising out of
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf:
The Santa Barbara Disaster

DAVID J. WALMSLEY*

INTRODUCTION

The familiar tidal process of flow and ebb' provides a fitting metaphor from which to launch a discussion of an historical development in the law of the sea. The flood tide of free seas began its
shoreward roll when the 17th century question of whether individual nations might acquire dominion over the sea 2 was answered
in 1702 with the assertion that "no sea is held today under the dominion of any prince." 3 Because of the coastal states' ability to
* A.B., Univ. Southern California, 1964; J.D., Harvard, 1969; formerly
with Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy, New York.
1. R.CARsoN, THE EDGE or =HE SEA 27 (1955).
2. This question gave rise to the Grotius-Selden Controversy wherein
Selden, in his work, MARE CLAusum (1635), held that dominion over the
sea was legally possible (subtitle: MARE Ex JuRE NATURAR Ssu GENTIUMV
HOInMuI
NON ESSE Comm=VUNE sED DoinIn PRIVATI SEU
OMNIUM
PROPPJETIS CAPEX PAIUrrEi AC TmLuREm), while Grotius insisted that no nation could acquire a dominion over the sea. H. GRoTius, MTARE LIBERUm
(1609). For a discussion of the Grotius-Selden Controversy see P. PoTTER,
THE FREEDOm OF =HE SEAs 57-80 (1924).
3. C. BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOmINIO Maln DIssERTATIo 60 (R. Magoffin

transl., J. Scott ed. 1923).
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maintain "command and possession" over a maritime belt "as far as

a cannon will carry,"4 the territorial sea was early recognized as an
exception to the notion that "the sea, viewed either as a whole or in

its principal parts, cannot become subject to private ownership." 5
Additionally, "it was quickly discovered that the occasional exercise of some exclusive authority beyond this belt had necessarily to
be honored .... -6 It was not until 1945, though, that the free seas
began their ebb from the shores: 7 in that year President Truman
proclaimed that ". . . the natural resources of the subsoil and sea
bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to
the coasts of the United States . . . [are] subject to its jurisdiction
and control."
This assertion of "sovereign rights," acquiesced in by most states9
and codified in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,1 0 had
as its purpose the encouragement of efforts to discover and to make
available new supplies of petroleum and other minerals 1 buried in
the earth beneath the high seas. By January of 1969, the exploitation of offshore petroleum deposits was progressing in earnest at
4. Id. at 44. See also Kent, The Historical Origin of the Three Mile
Limit, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954), and Walker, TerritorialWaters: The
Cannon Shot Rule, 22 Bran. Y. B. INTnL L. 210 (1945). As the two preceding
authorities point out, the "cannon-shot" rule is an oversimplification.
5. H. GRoI'us, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS Lami TRES 190 (F. Kelsey transl.

1925). Grotius, too, recognized this exception: "It seems clear, moreover,
that sovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in the same way as
sovereignty elsewhere, that is, as we have said above, through the instrumentality of persons and of territory." Id. at 214.
6. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBVEc ORDER or TE OCEANS 2
(1962). "Other Acts of Parliament which fix limits of jurisdiction beyond
three miles from the shore include those relating to smuggling, the public health, and slave ships .. .. "The United States in 1799 extended its
jurisdiction for such purposes to four leagues from the coast, and in 1807,
in an Act against the importation of slaves, the seizure of vessels laden
with certain cargoes within that distance was also authorized." T. FuLTox,
THE SOVEREIGNTY or TaE SEA 593 (1911).
7. More correctly, from the territorial sea.
8. PresidentialProc. No. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 59 STAT. 884 (1945).
9. "[E]xploitation of the subsoil by the adjoining country was widely
accepted." Edelman, Liability Problems in the Exploitation of the Seas, 5
TRiAL LAw. Q. 43, 48 (1968).
10. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. "The Convention represented the consensus of the nations and the final vote was 57 in favor,
only 3 against and 8 abstentions." Edelman, supra note 9, at 49.
11. PresidentialProc., supra note 8.

numerous sites on the United States' continental shelves.1 2
Then, despite the many assurances' 3 that there was "nothing to
fear"'I4 about offshore drilling, Well 21 on Platform A, Parcel 402,16
anchored six miles off the California coast' 6 in the Santa Barbara
Channel, "blew" on January 28, 1969,17 and for the next eleven days
reddish-brown crude oil bubbled into the blue Pacific at a rate of
nearly 1,000 gallons per hour.' 8 This dramatic event,19 "The Oil
Disaster of 1969,'120 raises not only urgent questions about the ade12. "There are more than 12,000 oil wells off the U.S. coasts, and the
number is increasing by more than 1,400 per year." CommIssioN ON
MARINE

ScIENCE, ENGINEERING AND REsouRcEs,

OuR NATION AND

THE SEA,

MR. Doc. No. 91-42, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 74 (1969) (hereinafter cited as:
COxVMISSION REPORT). "Offshore oil production is second only to fish as a
source of marine resource revenue." Id. at 83.
13. In response to a 1963 questionnaire from the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, the United States, after listing what
were believed to be the primary sources of pollution, ended with the asser-

tion that, . . .there is no evidence that off-shore drilling has, in anyway,
contributed to the pollution of the sea." INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME
CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY

OIL,

RESULTS OF AN

1963, at 103 (1964). This view still prevailed in 1967, when
Secretary of the Interior Udall assured apprehensive Santa Barbara officials "that the Federal Government would keep a close eye on the drilling.

INQUIRY MADE IN

'Always, Interior and Oil officials led us to believe we had nothing to fear,'
says Santa Barbara County Supervisor George Clyde." TIME, Feb. 14,
1969, at 23. Supervisor Clyde reiterated the point before the California
State Senate Natural Resources and Governmental Efficiency Committee
on February 18, 1969:

". .

. but always the Interior Department and oil

industry officials led us to believe we had nothing to fear. They said they
had perfected shut-off devices that were foolproof, even in such disasters
as a ship running into the platform or an earthquake." Interestingly
enough, the Commission on Marine Science, Engineering and Resources
recognized that ".

.

. despite the careful safety measures of the industry,

well blowouts, pipeline leaks, operator carelessness, and storm damage
still can cause serious damage." CoMMISSION REPORT, at 74.
14. TIME, Feb. 14, 1959, at 23.
15. D. Bickmore, Statement prepared for presentation before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Sen. Comm. on Public Works,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (Feb. 24, 1969). See supra note 14.
16. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 54, col. 2.
17. "What had happened was that last Tuesday morning [January 28]
a drill had cut a hole into a high-pressure deposit of oil and gas. Withdrawing the drill to renew the worn bit was like pulling a cork out of a bottle."
Id.
18. TnM, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. "A total of a quarter of a million gallons
had poured into the water, by Union Oil's estimates. Other qualified persons said the estimate was grossly low." The Oil Disaster of 1969, Santa
Barbara News-Press, Mar. 7, 1969 (Special Supplement), at 2, col. 1.
19. It is of interest to note that Secretary Udall once characterized offshore drilling, inter alia, as ". . . not as dramatic a source of pollution as
transport." WATER POLLUTION-1967 (Part 1), HEARINGS ON S. 1591, S.1604,
S.1870, AND S. 1341 BEFORE THE SuB-cOMM ON AM AND WATER POLLUTION
OF THE SENATE COmm. ON PUBLIc WORIs, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 237 (1967).

20. Santa Barbara News-Press, supra note 18, at 1, col. 1.
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quacy of governmental controls of offshore drilling but also the
larger question of the legal system's capacity for conflict resolution in a setting of ancient doctrine and rapid technological advance.
In essence, the Santa Barbara disaster is but another example of
a phenomenon which affects all life on earth in the twentieth century: environmental pollution wrought by unimpeded, or at best
inadequately impeded, technological advancement. If this were all
that the disaster entailed, it would merit little more than a footnote or a paragraph in a comprehensive study of the large problem.
But, as will be revealed in the pages following, Santa Barbara's
problem is unique since it casts into relief a wide spectrum of legal,
political, and economic considerations which are in desperate need
of examination. 21 As such, it provides a case study raising many
questions, the answers to which will have broad implications for
the whole area of environmental quality. The first step in such an
analysis, then, is to define the characters and the setting in which
they interact.
I

A.

Santa Barbara
Santa Barbara ....
county seat of Santa Barbara County, and
one of the world's most beautiful and wealthy small cities, is situated on the coastal shelf between the Pacific Ocean and the Santa
Ynez Mountains, . . . . It is the all-year-around equivalent of Bar
Harbor and Newport in the East, and is chiefly famous for its equable climate, its uniformity of architecture, and its prosperous
growth although isolated from any fostering industrial centers. It
is a city of many contradictions and each charming, a bit of Old
Spain and of New America and of the very heart of California all
blended as harmoniously as one of its own magnificent sunsets.
The city has no skyline-in the American sense of the word.
Seen from the ocean front, the most conspicuous features are redtiled or green roofs, white stucco walls, vividly green tropical trees,
and everywhere the polychromatic glow of flowers.

21. One student of the problems of the twentieth century has characterized the Santa Barbara disaster as a signal event since the community
response to the oil slick was, in his view, what is needed if man is to avoid
the "flight of the dodo into extinction." People must be made angry at
what is happening to their environment; the ". . . reaction that occurred in
Santa Barbara recently, as a consequence of the oil slick, is the sort of
thing that is going to happen more frequently and more dramatically in
the years ahead." N.Y. Times, April 7, 1969, at 10, col. 1 (quoting Prof.

Richard A. Falk).

Architectural design of public and commercial buildings, even
of most of the houses, is of a type now becoming known as the
California Style.
Santa Barbara's chief business is simply being Santa Barbara.
Her cool, healthful climate, the sea and the mountains attract people of wealth, social position, and leisure.
[T]he average Santa Barbaran and his wife and children are
the people who make the city what it is. They voted the bonds
with which to buy the ocean front; they worked for the elimination
of billboards; they tend their gardens, keep their lawns looking
like green Tientsin rugs, trim their hedges, and keep22 the corners
clean. They are proud of themselves and of their city.
It is only natural that the citizens of Santa Barbara would want
to preserve this idyllic setting. Several significant legislative
events demonstrate their concern. In order to prevent the erection
of unsightly offshore drilling rigs along the prized Santa Barbara
coast, the Cunningham-Shell Act was enacted in 1955 by the California Legislature. 23 Among other things, it created a sanctuary
sixteen miles long and extending three miles out from the coast
where no drilling would be allowed. 24 Because the Act provided
that drilling would be permitted if the underlying deposits were
being drained by wells adjacent to the sanctuary,2 the City
and County of Santa Barbara enacted zoning controls prohibiting
shore-based oil extraction along the length of the sixteen mile border.2 6 Then in 1968, when the Planning Commission and Board of

22. SOUTEiuM CALIFONIA WRnTERS' PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADmrsTPATioN, SANTA BAui3ARA 56-59 (1941).
23. Ch. 1724, [1955] CAL. SAT. 3165, now in CAL. PuB. REs. CODE ANN.
§§ 6871-6878 (West 1956). See discussion cited in notes 114 et seq., infra.
24. Id. § 16(b) or § 6871.2(b).
25. Id. § 6872.1.
26. R. Whitehead, Notes prepared for presentation before Sub-comm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Feb. 5, 1969). The problem is that the Santa Barbarans
can only insure that the submarine oil fields are not drained by onshore
wells. They have no control over drilling beyond the territorial sea, i.e.,
drilling by Federal lessees. Through application of some pressure on
Washington, the local citizens were able to get the Department of the Interior to create a two mile "buffer zone" beyond the sanctuary in the high
seas. Tnvm Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. County Supervisor George Clyde described the events thusly:
Early in 1966, we heard that the Federal Government planned to
lease sometime soon, probably in 1967. In December, 1966, the
Federal Government granted a single lease to Phillips on grounds
that this area was being drained by the Standard lease on State
land.
On February 28, 1967, a group of County officials, of which I was
a member, and representatives from the cities of Carpinteria and
Santa Barbara held a conference in Washington with Assistant
Secretary of Interior for Mineral Resources, J. Cordell Moore, and
his staff. The purpose of this conference was to impress upon
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Supervisors adopted an ordinance permitting construction of a processing plant to service drilling platforms on the outer continental
Interior Department officials the concern of the people of Santa
Barbara County that uncontrolled construction of platforms would
have a detrimental effect on the esthetic values of the South
Coast area, resulting in irreparable harm to the tourist, convention and vacation industry, as well as affecting the desirability of
the area from a residential standpoint. In addition, it was
pointed out that unless the Federal Government prohibited drilling
near the Sanctuary, the Sanctuary would probably be opened to
drilling by the State.
On May 1, 1967, we asked for a moratorium of one year (a request
which was never answered) so that we could study all ramifications of leasing.
In mid-May, 1967, Assistant Secretary Moore and staff made a trip
to Santa Barbara, inspected the area and met with local officials.
Again we made our plea for a year's time to study all aspects of
the proposed leasing program.
On September 22, 1967, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Public Land Management, Harry R. Anderson, came to Santa Barbara
and said what the Federal Government was willing to do. It
boiled down to a two-mile wide zone to protect the Sanctuary-a
buffer zone that is only good as long as Interior allows it. Secretary Anderson wanted our comments within a "very few days."
Interior wanted to advertise for bids around October 15th.
In answer to our pleas for six months to study the proposals, we
were given 60 days by Secretary Udall. During that interval, we
prepared a study, which I will file with you, and we went once
again to Washington in late November, 1967. We asked for an
extension of the buffer zone eastward to further protect the Sanctuary which, incidentally, if it had been granted would have prevented the drilling of this particular well. We also asked for a
much smaller area to be leased so that future technological developments could provide for underwater completions--particularly
close to shore. We also asked for measures to reduce the number
of platforms. None of our major requests were granted except the
original buffer zone.
G. Clyde, Statement before State Sen. Natural Resources and Governmental Efficiency Committee 1-3 (Feb. 18, 1969).
On March 21, 1969, Secretary Hickel announced, inter alia, the following:
The second major action I am taking today is the signing of an
order which turns the existing two-mile buffer opposite the Santa
Barbara State Oil Sanctuary into a permanent ecological preserve ....

Until today this area has had no legal status.

The

new Santa Barbara Ecological Preserve is 21,000 acres. It is inhabited by numerous species of fish and shell fish. This area,
...
is extremely valuable for fishing and other recreational uses.
In addition, all unleased areas south of the Santa Barbara Ecological Preserve will be held as an additional buffer zone. No drilling
or production will be permitted in this 34,000 acres. The buffer
will help protect the Preserve and maintain the scenic view from
Santa Barbara. The Ecological Preserve and its buffer thus will
total 55,000 acres.
About half of the remaining Federal lands in the channel are not
leased. Before any consideration is given to leasing these areas,

shelf, the voters reacted by rescinding the ordinance in a referendum.27 All of this indicates the determination of Santa Barbarans
28
to preserve their living, working, and recreational environment.
Naturally, there are also economic forces behind the desire to
keep the setting unspoilt: since the spot is so ideal, many visitors
are attracted to it and this alone accounts for 60 percent of the local
income. An additional 20 percent is derived from so-called "cleanindustries"--i.e., research and development outfits-which are also
attracted by the environmental assets.2 9
Most of Santa Barbara's area of sixteen square miles is included
on a narrow coastal shelf which skirts the Pacific where California's
coastline assumes a general east-west direction. About thirty miles
south, a string of four Channel Islands lying almost parallel to the
coast, breaks the destructive force of heavy seas and forms the outer
boundary of a deep channel used as a coastal shipping lane.80
Besides being environmentally unique, this area is also unique
from a geological standpoint. A Santa Barbara County Petroleum
Engineer has described the area thusly:
The Santa Barbara Channel is situated within the geomorphic
province of Southern California known as the Transverse Range.
These are a series of east-west trending mountain and valley systems that lie in a contrary position to the otherwise northwestsoutheast structural and topographic trend of California. One can
visualize this area as a gigantic bowl, with the Santa Ynez mountains on the north, the San Gabriel mountains to the east and the
Santa Monica mountains and their seaward extension called the
Channel Islands to the south. The west end of the basin extends
into the open sea. The larger portion (approximately two-thirds)
is known as the Sanata Barbara Channel. Since it is covered by
water, much of the complex geology can be inferred by a detailed
study of the surface geology of the Ventura basin. This data reveals a series of tight folds which are badly faulted. Several of
these features have been projected and followed seaward from the
Ventura Basin into the Santa Barbara Channel.
Further study of the surface geology of the Channel Islands to
the public will be consulted and its recommendations carefully
considered.
Statement by Secretary of the Interior, Walter J. Hickel, Dept. of the Interior, News Release, at 3 (March 21, 1969).
27. Whitehead, supra note 26, at 4.
28. Santa Barbara News-Press, supra note 18.
29. "Eighty percent of our economy on the South Coast is based on our
environment-we draw tourists and residents from all walks of life--we
have a flourishing University of California campus and numerous highly
technical research and 'think' factories." G. Clyde, Statement before Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Sen. Comm. on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (February 24, 1969). Whitehead, supra
note 26, at 3.
30. Sour nn

CALIFoRNIA WrmrR's PRoJEcT, supra note 22, at 60.
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the south and the Santa Ynez mountains to the north reveals
badly broken, crushed and faulted rocks.
To the center of this huge bowl, the ocean floor falls off rapidly,
reaching a water depth of over 2,000 feet at its deepest part.
Major faults can be traced through the Channel. Many of these
must be assumed to be active as indicated by the 1925 earthquake
and numerous more recent smaller tremors.3 1
Given these facts-that Santa Barbarans are especially jealous
about preserving their environment, that the local economy is dependent upon its preservation, that the geological structure is at
best questionable and little is to be gained locally by offshore drilling 3 2-- it is understandable that a storm of protest arose when the
Federal Government in early 1966 made known its plans to offer oil
leases on the adjacent outer continental shelf.33 In addition to the
fact that the Federal lessees' platforms would constitute "eye-sores,"
there were fears that the leasing of Federal lands would render
State and local legislative efforts null since the State would probably begin to grant leases in the sanctuary to guard against
drain-off by the adjacent Federal lessees' operations. 34 At about
this same time, the memory of the damage wrought by the Torrey
Canyon disaster35 was fresh in the minds of the local citizenry; but
their fears about oil pollution from offshore drilling were largely
dismissed by officialdom.3 6 Despite protests, the Government in
February, 1968, advertised 110 blocks of seabed area containing
5,700 acres each and received bids totalling $603 million for 75 of
them.3 7 The bidders for these blocks were large American oil companies; these lessees, along with the Federal Government lessor, are
the two remaining major characters in the Santa Barbara drama.

31. Bickmore, supra note 15, at 1-2.
32. "[T]he oil industry contributes only 2% to the basic income of the
South Coastal Area." Whitehead, supra note 26, at 3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1969, at 1, col. 1.
33. See note 26, supra, TnE, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23; N.Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1968, at 1, col. 1.
34. See note 26, supra.
35. For a discussion of this disaster and the legal problems engendered
thereby see Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44
Dxav. L. J. 400 (1967).
36. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
37. Id. "The highest bid was from a combine of Gulf, Texaco, Mobil and
Union Oil Companies on Parcel 402, for $61.4 million. It is on this parcel
that the disaster occurred." See Whitehead, supra note 26, at 4.

B. The Off Shore Oil Industry
The Federal government, as the nation's largest land owner, exercises considerable supervisory control over oil and gas operations
upon its lands. The United States Department of the Interior, established in 1848, is charged with administering over these federal
lands with respect to oil and gas leasing,38 exploration, development and production. 9 This is done through two offices of the
Department: the Bureau of Land Management, which handles
the leasing of public lands 40 and the Geological Survey, which,
through its Conservation Division, supervises the extraction of minerals, oil and gas from the leased lands. 41 Under this arrangement,
by 1963 nearly 125,000 leases, comprising over 87 million acres of
42
public land, were outstanding.
In 1953, Congress declared 43 that "(1) title to and ownership of
the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the
respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and
waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, lease,
develop, and use the said lands and natural resources ... are...
vested in ... the respective States. .... ,,4
Three months later Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953, 41 which formally extended seaward the United
States' jurisdiction over the continental shelf from the offshore
boundaries of the coastal States.48 Among other things, the Act
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior "to grant to the highest...
bidder... oil and gas leases on submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf ....
,,47 By 1963 the Federal Government had let
over 3 1/2 million acres of seabed off the Florida, Louisiana and
Texas coasts to 846 lessees. 8 By 1969, the number had climbed to
38. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior to lease the public lands for the development
and production of oil, gas and certain other minerals.
39. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
40. Id. at 25.
41.

DEP'T Or THE INTEoR,

PLA3M FACTS ABOUT OIL

21 (1963).

U.S. GEOLOGICAL Sunvsw

10 (un-dated pam-

phlet).
42. DEPARTMENT OF TnE INTEioa, supranote 39, at 24.
43. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315.
44. Id. § 1311(a).
45. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343.
46. Id. § 1332(a).
47. Id. § 1334(a) (1). While one would expect that the Mineral Leasing

Act of 1920 might authorize the Secretary to lease offshore submerged
lands (see supra note 38), Justheim v. McKay, 229 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1956),
cert. den. 351 U.S. 933 (1956), held otherwise.
48. DEP'T oF TE INTERioR, supra note 39, at 25.
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1,000 including the 71 leases off Santa Barbara4 9 which alone encompass nearly 1,000 square miles of seabed. 50
That offshore drilling is now "big business" 5'1 is evident from the
following data: at present the industry has invested over $13 billion in offshore operations; 52 yearly investment is over $1 billion
and this figure is projected to increase an average of 18 percent annually over the coming decade; 53 the offshore oil industry is expected to continue to grow and to account for at least 33 percent of
total world oil production in 10 years. 54 A significant expenditure
included in these investment data is the cost of rentals, royalties
and bonuses paid to the Federal Government; these have amounted
to $1.6 billion thus far for the Santa Barbara concessions alone.55
Offshore drilling differs from land-based operations in several
respects. First, it is more expensive: the modern heavy drilling rig
costs about $1 million and will drill three or four wells per year
while the largest offshore drilling ship designed as of 1962 cost $4
million.55 Second, one of the reasons for the greater expense of offshore drilling is the need for new technology when operating in
the ocean environment. 57 Third, whereas most shore-based drilling
49. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 2E, col. 7.
50. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
51. The offshore oil industry is not only a big business, but the biggest
business being conducted in this area. "The dockside value of the resources taken in 1967 by U.S. firms from the shelf and water adjacent to
the United States has been estimated by the Commission at $2 billion
per year. Of this amount, 50 per cent was from petroleum, 15 per cent from
gas, 20 per cent from fish, and 15 per cent from other activities." ComzvmssioN REPORT,

supra note 12, at 158.

52. Id. at 159.
53. Id. at 122.
54. Id. "The offshore oil industry is growing rapidly. Several thousand
offshore platforms have been built in the Gulf of Mexico alone. New
developments are expected off Alaska and the Atlantic seaboard. Structures for 600-foot water depths are being designed. Pipelines for oil and
Id. at 54.
gas have been laid more than 70 miles offshore."
55. TIm, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23.
56. DEP'T or THE INTERiOR, supra note 39, at 8-9. "The twin-rig location
and dual platforms include housing for 44 men in the drilling crews, materials for handling equipment, helicopter deck, mud system logging unit
and bulk cement equipment, and represent an investment of approximately $10 million for the onsite equipment only." 46 FED. POWER CoMvnM.
_ANx. REP. 158 (1966).

57. In proceeding onto the continental shelf, the petroleum industry
has surmounted one obstacle after another and has succeeded in developing exploration and exploitation technologies for working at

is conducted on privately or State owned land,68 the seabed and
subsoil are owned by the coastal State or the National Government
and in the latter case operations must proceed through a unique
medium: the waters of the high seas. These features of offshore
drilling tend to compound the problems and conflicts 0 with which
the industry has always had to contend; further, they have also
created some new problems and conflicts putting new stresses on
the legal system.
II. THE LAW OF POLLUTION
Having defined the industrial setting, some discussion of certain
aspects of the legal system is in order before attempting an analysis
of the specific legal issues raised by the Santa Barbara disaster.
The fact that, there, oil escaped into the waters of the high seas differentiates this occurrence from the usual oil industry tort in at
least two ways: 1) the very real fact that the pollution of water
sea. Exploratory drilling has begun in water depths of 1,300 feet,
the feasibility of core drilling in 20,000 feet of water will be tested
shortly. Within 10 years, undersea core drilling may be accomplished by remote control, and an increasing number of production
wells will be completed beneath the water's surface.

Recovery of oil offshore is necessarily more expensive than on
land, even though certain exploratory tasks can be accomplished
at lower cost. Nevertheless, many companies anticipate that new
oil fields in the comparatively virgin marine areas will be sufficiently large and productive to be competitive with oil fields on
land. With continued improvements in technology such as the
building of platforms to service multiple wells, offshore production
costs can become increasingly competitive with onshore costs.
CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 12, at 123.
58. "In the five public land States producing oil and gas, the Federal
Government owns approximately 36 and % per cent of the acreage but
produces only about 13 percent of the oil and gas produced in these States.
The 1946 total production from these lands was approximately 62,000,000
barrels, while the production from state and privately owned lands in the
same States was in excess of 380,000,000 barrels." SENATE CoMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, REPORT ON SUBMERGED LANDS AcT, to accompany S.J. Res. 13, S.Rep. No. 133; 83 Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 71 (1953).
59. Offshore petroleum development has not been without conflict.
Explosives used in exploring for oil on the Grand Banks have
caused considerable concern among fishermen. The probability
that oil will be produced generates additional concern about possible oil spills, pipelines and other hazards to fishing. Although
mineral development of the continental shelf is subject to U.S.
control, the fisheries beyond the 12-mile limit are an international
resource, causing the potential oil-versus-fish confrontation to have
still more serious overtones. "The density of oil drilling platforms
in the Gulf of Mexico is so great that the U.S. Coast Guard and
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, working cooperatively with
the industry, have been compelled to establish fairways for shipping in and out of Gulf ports. Oil companies of the west coast
frequently have placed wells below the surface when aesthetic
values were important. Subsurface structures, however, create
different kinds of navigation hazards, particularly to fishing trawls.
CoinvIssloN REPORT,at 54-55.
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resulted from the "blow-out" distinguishes this case from the usual
tort question and brings to bear the narrower, more specific law of
water pollution with its specialized rules and maxims; 2) by virtue
of the disaster's occurring on the seabed below the high seas, more
than just local legal machinery will be involved in the resolutory
process. It is because of these two factors that a discussion of the
law of pollution of water and of the efforts of various levels of government to implement that law is deemed appropriate.
Like most areas of Anglo-American jurisprudence, the law of
pollution of water has derived from two sources: judicial decisions and statutes. 60 The concern of the former has been to protect
and preserve the proprietary rights of riparian owners against pollution by way of damages and injunction. 61 "The general rule that a
riparian owner on the banks of a natural stream is entitled to receive the flow of water in its natural state and unpolluted ... applies also to tidal waters."62 Thus, pollution resulting in damage
to oyster beds, fisheries, rowboats, or property on beaches and waterfronts can occasion tort liability based on negligence or nuisance. 63 In Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp.,6 4 when an oil
slick caused damage to shore property ("loss of use of the beach and
60. A. WISDOM, THE LAw ox PoLLuTioN or WATER 3 (1966).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 51. "Tidal waters are those which are subject to the regular
ebb and flow of the ordinary highest tides (Reese v. Miller (1882), 8 A.B.D.
626) .... The thing to be looked to is the fact of absence or prevalence
of fresh water, though strongly impregnated by salt; where this fresh water prevails the river is non-tidal (Horne v. Mackenzie (1939) 6 Cl. & Fin.
628) ."

63. Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENy.
L.J. 400, 415 (1967). This is not to suggest that there are two theoriesnegligence and nuisance-upon which liability for pollution can be founded.
As Prosser warns, ". . . negligence is merely one type of conduct which
may give rise to a nuisance....
Today liability for nuisance may rest

upon an intentional invasion of the plaintiffs interests, or a negligent one,
or conduct which is abnormal and out of place in its surroundings, and so
falls fairly within the principle of strict liability." W. PROSSER, THE LAw
or TORTS § 88, at 595. (Hereinafter cited as PROSSER). "Nuisance, in short,

is not a separate tort in itself, subject to rules of its own. Nuisances are
types of damage-the invasion ...

of interests, by conduct which is tor-

tious because it falls into the usual categories of tort liability." Id. at 598.
Thus, the damage wrought by oil pollution is nuisance; liability is usually
founded upon the negligence of the one responsible for the oil's escape.
The issue is whether the Santa Barbara disaster was on account of negligence or if the doctrine of strict liability will apply.
64. 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

shore . . .loss of use of littoral or riparian rights-i.e., swimming,
sun-bathing, fishing, boating, picnicking, etc .. ."), 0 an action in
nuisance lay and resulted in an award of compensation "for such
annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort suffered by particular
claimants ..... 66
Clearly, the concern of decisional law has been with "making the
07
plaintiff whole" after he has suffered because of a polluted water.
The statutory approach, on the other hand, has been geared to the
prevention of pollution before any damage is suffered.0 8 Since the
earliest6 9 anti-water pollution statute was enacted in England in
1388, and particularly since World War I, "attempts have been
made to control and prevent pollution, through national domestic
legislation in several countries, through intergovernmental action,
and through voluntary industry arrangements." 70
65. Id. at 938.
66. Id. at 937.
67. WIsDOM, supranote 60, at 3.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 7.
70. C. HERTER, REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL, LONDON, 1954, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL, S. EXEc. C.,

86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960), Secretary Herter continued with a brief
history of the efforts to prevent pollution of the seas between World War I
and the London Conference of 1954.
In 1922 the U.S. Congess by joint resolution (42 STAT. 821), called
attention to damage being done by the discharge of oil on the high
seas, and requested the President to call an international conference for the purpose of adopting measures to prevent the pollution
of the seas and coastal waters of nations by oil. An interdepartmental committee, established to draw up recommendations, issued a preliminary report in 1924, which was followed by enactment of the Oil Pollution Act, 1924 (43 STAT. 604; 33 U.S.C. 431)
and by the convening by the United States on June 8, 1926, of an
Intergovernmental Conference of Major Maritime Nations. Representatives of 13 governments signed the final act but no government adopted the convention drafted at the Conference. The International Shipping Conference (composed of private shipowners'
organizations of the principal maritime countries) also met in
1926 and, though it did not make definite recommendations, a
number of shipowners voluntarily entered into so-called 'gentlemen's agreements' to refrain from discharging oily water within
50 miles of any coast. The problem of oil pollution was laid before the League of Nations in 1934, and in 1936 the League proposed to convene a conference to consider a draft convention
which, in many respects, resembled the document drawn upon
Washington in 1926. The proposed conference was not held and
World War II intervened. In 1945, the United Nations undertook
consideration of the problem. After consulting governments and
receiving their views, the Economic and Social Council in 1953
resolved to establish a group of experts to correlate the material
made available to the United Nations and to draw conclusions.
This work was postponed indefinitely when the Government of
the United Kingdom, after consultation with the Secretary General, decided to issue invitations to attend a diplomatic conference
in London early in 1954.
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A.

IntergovernmentalAction

For present purposes there are two international conventions
worthy of note: The Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil 1 and the Convention on the High Seas.72 The latter,
which entered into force in 1962, provides in Article 24 as follows:
Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from
takthe exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil,
73
ing account of the existing treaty provisions on the subject.
Thus, while the Convention on the Continental Shelf affirms the
coastal state's ". . . sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting it
and exploiting its natural resources," 74 this provision seems to raise
a correlative duty to exercise these rights in such a way as to prevent pollution of the seas. Further, it was thought to have created
an obligation upon the United States, as well as upon the other
acceding states, which would be fulfilled by ratification of the Con5
vention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil7
The purpose of this convention was to prevent the pollution of the
high seas by oil and oily wastes discharged by tankers and other
ships and thereby control their harmful effects on coasts and coastal
waters, on birds and other wildlife, and on fish and marine resources. 76 While recognizing the results of pollution, the Convention was not only overly narrow in its appraisal of the causes, but
also did not completely fulfill the Article 24 obligations of the High
Seas Convention. As the Santa Barbara disaster has so dramati71. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, opened
for signature, May 12, 1954, 3 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900. This treaty
was recently amended in order to deal with the intentional discharge of oil
or oily waters on the high seas, prohibiting such discharges within 50
miles of a nation's coasts. N.Y. Times, May 21, 1970, at 1, col. 3. In
President Nixon's message to Congress, he opined that the amendments
may not go into effect for several years since they require ratification

by other nations. 6 PRESIDENTIAL DocuKSErs 660, 661 (1970).

72. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
73. Id. Art. 24.
74. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, Art. H, § 1.
75. SENATE Comn. ON FOREIGN RELATIONs, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE SEA BY OIL, S. EXEC.

REP. No. 4, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961).
76. Id. at 1.

cally shown, tankers and other ships are not the sole source of pollution. Of course, in 1954 pollution from offshore drilling was not
envisioned as significant, 77 and the draftsmen's efforts reflect this.
Here, then, is one example of a rapid technological advance with its
attendant problems and the legal system's moving too slowly to
keep pace; its performance at the domestic level is only slightly better.
B. Domestic Efforts
The Oil Pollution Act of 192478 was the first piece of comprehensive legislation dealing with the problem.7 9 It made it unlawful "for any person to discharge . . . from any boat or vessel
oil by any means, or manner into or upon the navigable waters of the United States ..
"..
,8o (emphasis added). Although
...

amended in 196681 in order to provide, inter alia,for the cleaning up
77. See, e.g., Resolution I of the Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, supra note 71, where the Conference noted that,
"[v]ery large quantities of persistent oils are regularly discharged into the
sea by tankers as a result of the washing of their tanks and the disposal of
their oil ballast water." The Conference did not mention pollution from
offshore drilling. By 1962, Admiral Alfred C. Richmond, U.S.C.G., Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the IMCO Conference for Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, England, March 26-April 13, 1962,
".

was able to report:

.

. while not the sole source of pollution these dis-

charges [from ships] are by far the principal one. Recent estimates indicate that world shipping is discharging waste oil into the sea at the rate of
one million tons per year. During the period 1949-1965 it had been estimated that both the tonnage of petroleum moving by sea and the tonnage of the world fleet of oil kinds of ships will increase about 45 percent."
CoNFERENcE ON CONTRAcTING GOVERNMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION OF THE SEA By OIL, 1954, S. ExEc.

D., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1963).
Discussion of another treaty, the Internation Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, signed at Brussels, November 29, 1969, was
omitted from the text because its concern is exclusively with pollution
"from the escape or discharge of oil from ships." Apparently, the lesson of
Santa Barbara was lost on the draftsmen or else they determined that a
treaty dealing with sources of oil pollution other than ships-viz., offshore
drilling-would not be ratifiable.
78. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 STAT. 604, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-437 (1964),
as amended Nov. 3, 1966, PuB. L. 89-753, Title II, § 211 (a), 80 STAT. 1252.
79. Nanda, supra note 63, at 408.
80. Act of June 7, 1924, supra note 78.
81. The 1966 amendments have been much criticized for their definition
of "discharge":

".

.

. any grossly negligent, or willful spilling, leaking,

pumping, pouring, emitting, or emptying of oil." Id. § 211 (a) (3). "In
1924, the Oil Pollution Act was passed by Congress authorizing the fining
of entities which negligently discharged oil into navigable waters. In
1966, Congress rendered the Oil Pollution Act of 1924 all but unenforceable
by making 'gross negligence' the test for liability rather than simple negligence" (emphasis in original statement). C. O'Brien, Statement before the
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of oil spills, the law still did not apply to pollution other than that
caused by discharges from ships or vessels.8 2 Furthermore, the
1966 Act's definition of "navigable waters of the United States" as
".. . all portions of the sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States .... "83 suggests that it would not apply to discharges
into the high seas, even by ships or vessels.8 4
Federal law bearing directly on the problem of pollution of the
sea caused by offshore drilling is found in the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act 8 5 and the Regulations86 and orders promulgated in
pursuance thereof.
The Act itself authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, in his administration of the law, to
...prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer
Continental Shelf ... and ... such rules and regulations shall apSub-comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (Feb. 24, 1969). See also WATER CONTROL
NEWS, Oct. 24, 1966, at 31, § (2)3.
82. "..... [T]he Oil Pollution Act does not apply to oil discharges from
shore-based facilities. This omission is critically significant. The Corps of
Engineers estimates that 40 percent of all oil pollution enforcement cases
in the past grew out of nonwaterborne oil discharges." Secretary of the
Interior and Secretary of Transportation, A Report on Pollution of the Nation's Waters by Oil and Other Hazardous Substances, at 15 (February,
1968). What was even more "critically significant" was that the Secretaries,
in pointing out the Act's weaknesses, did not recognize an additional weakness: its nonapplicability to oil discharges from offshore drilling operations.
Some time after the Santa Barbara spill Congress dealt with these problems when it enacted the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, P.L.
91-224, 84 STAT. 91, which implements the policy of the United States, as
therein declared, that "there should be no discharges of oil into or upon
the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or
upon the waters of the contiguous zone. Section 11(b) (1). Such policy is
applied to persons in charge of vessels, on shore facilities and offshore
facilities.
83. Act of June 7, 1924, supra note 78, § 211 (a) (4).
84. But see the Oil Pollution Act of 1961, 33 U.S.C. 1001-1015 (1964), the
implementing legislation for the Convention on Prevention of Pollution of
the Sea by Oil. "The 1961 Act prohibits discharges by ships of American
registry of oil or oil wastes beyond the United States territorial waters in
specified zones." Nanda, supra note 63, at 410.
85. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1343 (1953), 67 STAT. 462.
86. Oil and Gas and Sulfur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf,
Operating Regulations, 30 C.F.R. pt. 250, and Outer Continental Shelf
Mineral Deposits, Leasing Regulations, 43 C.F.R. pt. 3380.

ply to all operations conducted under a lease issued or maintained
under the provisions of this [Act] ."87
It further provides that knowing or willful violators of these rules
and regulations
for the prevention of waste, [or] the conservation of the natural resources ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of not more than $2,000 or by imprisonment for not
more than six months, or by both .... 88
The lessee, while not specifically prohibited by any term of
his lease from polluting the sea,89 does agree ". . . to carry on all
operations in accordance with approved methods and practices including those provided in the operating and conservation regulations for the Outer Continental Shelf. .. ",0
The Regulations, in pertinent part, provide that "[t]he lessee
shall take all reasonable precautions to prevent damage or waste of
any natural resource or injury to life or property or the aquatic
life of the seas ....
91 The lessee shall not pollute the water of the
high seas or damage the aquatic life of the sea or allow extraneous
matter to enter and damage any mineral or water-bearing forma-

tion."

92

In addition to these Regulations and their inclusion by reference
in the law applicable to leases granted under the Act,9 3 the Regional
Oil and Gas Supervisors for the Gulf Coast region and the Pacific
Coast region have promulgated Orders which state (here quoting
from the Gulf Coast Region Order): "All oil, gas, and sulphur
operations shall be conducted in such a manner as to preclude the
pollution of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. . . . Immediate corrective action shall be taken in all cases where accidental pollution
has occurred."9 4
While all of the foregoing is clearly directed at the prevention of
pollution of the sea, it is nowhere specified what exactly is to be
87. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supra note 85, § 1334(a) (1).
88. Id. § 1334(a) (2).
89. PUBLIC LAND LAw REVIEW CoMMIssIoN, 1 STUDy or OuTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS OF THE UNITED STATES, October, 1968 (report prepared by
the Law Firm of Nossaman, Waters, Scott, Krueger & Riordan, Los Angeles, California, Robert B, Krueger, Project Director), § 4.80, at 270.
90. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Oil and Gas
Lease of Submerged Lands, Form 3380-1 (February, 1966), 2 (i).
91. 30 C.F.R. § 250.30.
92. 30 C.F.R. § 250.42.
93. PUBLIc LAND LAw REVIEw ComMssioN, supranote 89, at 270.
94. Gulf Coast OCS Order no. 7 (January 11, 1965). The Pacific Coast
Region counterpart is nearly identical. See Putmic LAND LAw REVIEW COmMIss ON, supra note 89, at 271, 333, n.406.
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95
done when an event such as the Santa Barbara disaster occurs.
This explains in part the reason for Secretary Hickel's much ballyhooed 90 indecision when first confronted with the problem of dealing with the eruption off Santa Barbara.

Probably in an effort to quell adverse commentary, but more
likely in recognition of the need to fill the obvious void in the Regulations, the Department of the Interior issued, on February 17,
1969, the following amendment to the Regulations:
(b) If the waters of high seas are polluted by the drilling or
production operations of the lessee, and such pollution damages or
threatens to damage aquatic life, wildlife, or public or private property, the control and removal of the pollutant and the reparation
of any damage, to whomsoever occurring, proximately resulting
therefrom shall be at the expense of the lessee, and on failure of
the lessee to control and remove the pollutant the Supervisor, in co95. But cf. § 2(i) of the Standard Lease, which provides that the Lessee

must carry out at his own expense ".... all lawful and reasonable orders of
[i.e., 'to carry on
the Lessor relative to the matters in this paragraph ...

all operations in accordance with approved methods and practices including
those provided in the operating and conservation regulations for the Outer
Continental Shelf']." Thus, assuming the Secretary's stop drilling order
was "lawful and reasonable" (see discussion cited in infra note 128), there
should be no excuse for the delay in its issuance. As it turns out, the decision to halt was based on Federal regulations ". .

authorizing such ac-

tion where there is 'immediate serious or irreparable damage' to the offshore mineral deposit involved." N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1969, at 17, col. 3.
Thus, it seems that the threat of actual pollution is alone not enough to
halt the drilling.
96. See e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1969, at 36, col. 2 (Editorial entitled:
Smugness on Oil Slick).
When Secretary of the Interior Hickel flew over the slick earlier
this week it was already evident that no further reliance could be
placed in the brave assurances the oil companies had given the
Johnson Administration a year ago. At that time the industry
ridiculed the fears expressed by conservationists and persuaded the
Government that there was no pollution risk.
With that history and the black record of error unfolded beneath
him, the course of prudence-to say nothing of responsibilityfor Mr. Hickel would have been to insist on an indefinite shutdown
of all drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel. Instead, Mr. Hickel's
drilling moratorium lasted barely 24 hours. It is inconceivable
that a review of all the complex factors involved in the original
accident could have been completed in so short a time, much less
provide dependable guarantees against a recurrence.
And then, in N.Y. Times, March 1, 1969, at 30, cols. 1 & 2 (Editorial
entitled: I-hcIEL vs. THE PoLLuTEFs): "Secretary of the Interior Walter J.
Hickel is proving a quick learner-to the country's benefit. After his
initial fumbles in coping with the Santa Barbara oil pollution disaster, he
emerged as a champion of the toughest possible measures to guard against
future trouble of the same sort."

operation with other appropriate agencies of the Federal, State,
and local governments, or in cooperation with the lessee, or both,
shall have the right to accomplish the control and removal of the
pollutant at the cost of the lessee, but such action shall not relieve
of responsibility for reparation of damages as provided
the lessee
97
herein.
This amendment is noteworthy in two rather unrelated respects.
First, as indicated in the accompanying comment, "the amendment
shall become effective on publication in the Federal Register [i.e.,
February 21, 1969]." This prospective effect raises 98 the practical
objection that the new regulation may not be applicable to the very
situation that prompted its issuance. 9 Second, despite its being
part of a package of preventative measures, 100 the amendment de97. 34 FED. REG. 2503-04 (February 21, 1969), amend, to 30 C.F.R. 250.42.
98. This presumption of prospective effect is strengthened by the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act's provision dealing with cancellation of a
lease: "Whenever the owner of a lease fails to comply with any of the provisions of this [Act], or of the lease, or of the regulations issued under this
[Act] and in force and effect on the date of the issuance of the lease ...
such lease may be forfeited and cancelled . . . [etc.]" (emphasis added).
This indicates that the lessees in the Santa Barbara Channel cannot have
their leases cancelled if they fail to comply with the new amendment since
it was not in effect when the lease was issued. It further suggests that
regulations can only have a prospective effect. But see 30 C.F.R. § 250.100
(a) which provides that, ". . . the regulations in this part will supersede
the provisions of any lease. . . ." The presumption created by the cancellation rule, which is also contained in the lease (Form 3380-1, § 7),
should be rebutted by § 250.100 (a).
99. See e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969 at 1, col. 1: "An underwater oil
well was finally capped today [February 8] by an enormous dose of mud
and cement after the oil had coated more than 30 miles of beaches and
harbors with gummy black slick and caused untold harm to wildlife."
[Paul DeFalco, Jr., regional director of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration] estimated that it would take the crews about three
days to clean properly the sandy beaches." Id. at col. 2. Thus, according
to this report the clean up operation should have been well along by the
February 21 date on which the amendment became effective. Of course,
the lasting damage, as was done to the aquatic life and wildlife, should
fall within the terms of the amended regulation.
100. On February 18, 1969, in announcing the new "regulations," Secretary Hickel stated: "Our specific goal has been to develop tough new regulations which will help prevent any future disasters such as we recently
witnessed in the Santa Barbara Channel off the coast of California."
Quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at 32, col. 1. The Times went on to
point out the substance of some of the other "regulations":
"One new
guideline provides that variances or departures from regulations covering
the casings used in wells and the depth to which the casings must be placed
below the ocean floor will no longer be approved in field offices. The
variances must now be submitted to Geological Survey headquarters here.
Another new guideline provides that all wells will be cased and cem'ented in a manner that will not allow oil and gas in different fluidbearing strata to mix." Id. For text of new "regulations" see U.S. Geological Survey, Draft, Mar. 19, 1969 (which will become OCS Order No. 10
(March-, 1969).
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parts from the traditional statutory approach in its concern with
reparation after the damage is done. While admittedly filling the
aforementioned void in the Regulations, this remedial approach,
more importantly, may be indicative of a feeling in the Department
of the Interior that the common law is ill-equipped to deal with this
problem.
In general then, it can be said that the criticism levelled at the
overall Federal role in coastal zones-that it has grown haphazardly' 0 1 -is also true of its role in the prevention of pollution of the
sea stemming from offshore drilling operations. Although the Marine Sciences, Engineering and Resources Commission would focus
responsibility for coastal zone management in the adjacent
States, 10 2 their records on pollution control matters have been less
than exemplary.
For two reasons the discussion of State efforts will draw exclusively upon the California experience in its statutory approach to
water pollution control: 1) the Santa Barbara disaster, though
originating outside of State jurisdiction, 103 has profound repercussions in areas of vital concern to California; 2) that State has been
praised as having an unsurpassed program for water pollution
control. 04
At the highest level of generality one finds the California Water
Code,105 enacted in 1943 to consolidate and revise the law relating to
water. 1 The sections dealing with water pollution' 0 7 provide,
inter alia, for the establishment of a State Water Pollution Control
Board 08 and Regional Water Pollution Control Boards 0 9 to formu101. CoMnImssioN REPORT, supra note 12 at 56.
102. Id. at 57.
103. The "blow-out" occurred on the outer Continental Shelf over which
the Federal Government exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, supranote 85, § 1333 (a) (1).
104. "Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall has stated that California
has an unsurpassed program for water pollution control." Regional Control of Air and Water Pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, 55 CAL. L.
REV. 702, 717 (1967). See address by Secretary Udall, dedication ceremonies
of the Sunoil Filtration Plant, San Francisco, September, 1966, quoted in
Statement by R. Gupta, [Member, State Water Quality Control Board, San
Francisco, Nov. 17, 1966]." Id. at 717, n.145.
105. CAL. WAT. CODE (Deering 1954).

106. Id. Preamble.
107. Id. §§ 13000-13104, added by ch. 1549, [1949] CAL. STATS. § 1, 2792.
108. Id. ch. 3, §§ 13010-25. For a critical analysis of the Board and

late and implement a policy for the control of water pollution.
Unfortunately, the draftsmen apparently did not envision pollution
arising out of offshore drilling: the definition of "pollution" is limited to ". . . impairment of the quality of the waters of the State by
sewage or industrialwaste . . .which . . .adversely affect [s] such
waters for domestic, industrial, agricultural, navigational, recreational or other beneficial use" 110 (emphasis added). Thus, while
the Code is applicable to the waters of the territorial sea,111 unless
an offshore well's "blowing out" can be termed "industrial waste,"
it is inapplicable to occurrences like the Santa Barbara disaster.
More directly in point are those sections of the California Public
Resources Code' 12 dealing with Oil and Gas Leases on Tidal and
Submerged Lands. 13
First, there is a section excluding certain areas of the coastal area
from oil and gas extraction." 4 While this quite obviously would
preclude pollution as well, it was probably motivated by a desire to
preserve the areas for recreational and residential use. This thesis
is supported by the fact that the excluded areas may be leased for
gas and oil extraction if they are being drained by others drilling
from adjacent lands. 1 5 Further, the allowance of slant-drilling
from the shore "... to preserve and protect the highly developed
,""' suggests motives other
recreational and residential area ....
than pollution control.
Second, the Code prohibits (without providing penalties for violations) " [ p] ollution and contamination of the ocean and tidelands
and all impairments of and interference with bathing, fishing or
navigation in the waters of the ocean .... ,117
its role in the Santa Barbara disaster, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 77,
cols. 1 & 2.
109. CAL. WAT. CODE, supranote 105, ch. 4, §§ 13040-64.
110. Id. § 13005.
111. Id. See also CAL. CoNsT. Art. XXI, § 1 and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 170-2
(West 1966).
112. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE (West 1956).
113. Id. §§ 6871-6878.
114. Id. § 6871.2. This section excludes the territorial belt (3 nautical
miles wide) of portions of Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo
Counties from oil leasing.
115. Id. § 6872.1. One of the many ironies arising out of the situation in
Santa Barbara is the fact that Federal leasing beyond Santa Barbara's
sanctuary ultimately has the effect of forcing California to lease in the
proscribed areas (under the authority of this section) or to allow the
State's resources to be drained away by Federal lessees.
116. Id. § 6872.2.
117. Id. § 6873. More correctly, the Code requires that this prohibition, inter alia, be included as a term of the offshore lease. But see, 21
Op. ATT'Y GE. 26 (1953). "Public Resource Code section 6873, generally
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Finally, mention should be made of the leasing authority's discretionary power to deny a lease if its issuance would result in
"impairments or interference with the developed shore line, recreational or residential areas adjacent to the proposed leased acre' s
age."11
One of the factors the Commission must consider in reaching its decision (after holding appropriate hearings) is whether the
lease would "[c]reate any fire hazard or hazards, or smoke, smog
or dust nuisance, or pollution of waters surrounding or adjoining
said areas."' 19
While these State leasing provisions have no direct bearing on
outer Continental Shelf operations, 12 0 they are evidence of a State
policy to prevent the pollution, as well as to balance competing uses,
of the coastal zone.
Other areas of California law, not limited to offshore drilling, are
also relevant to the matters under consideration. The California
Harbors and Navigation Code1 2 provides that "any person that intentionally or negligently causes or permits any oil to be deposited
in the waters of this state ... shall be liable civilly in an amount
not exceeding six thousand dollars ....
" plus the costs of clean-up
and abatement of the oil deposit. The amount of the civil penalty
is based upon the "amount of discharge and the likelihood of permanent injury"; it is recoverable by the governmental agency charged
with clean-up and abatement. 22 Too, the California Fish and Game
Code 1 23 provides for the State's recovery of damages in a civil action "against any person who unlawfully or negligently takes or destroys any bird, mammal, fish, or amphibia" protected by state law:
"[t]he measure of damages is the amount which will compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused by the destruction of such
birds, mammals, fish, or amphibia.' ' - 24 These provisions of two
requires slant drilling into tidelands, and prohibits pollution of the ocean
and tidelands by drilling operations. [Its end is] . .. to keep the drilling
operations on the uplands in order to prevent pollution."
118. Id. § 6873.2.
119. Id. § 6873.2(d).
120. See supra note 103.
121. CAL..

HAR.

& NAy. CODE (West 1955, Supp. 1968-69).

122. Id. § 151. It should be noted that this section, in imposing civil
penalties upon polluters, does not eliminate other means of proceeding
against water polluters, People v. Union Oil Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 566,
74 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1968).
123. CAL. FISH & GAamE CODE (West 1958).
124. Id. § 2014.

widely differing Codes provide the means of somewhat undoing the
damage created by oil pollution.
Finally, local ordinances are of some importance. Although their
authority is usually preempted from the shoreline seaward by the
State and Federal governments, 125 they can be of value in protecting local interests and regulating shore-based effects of offshore operations. An example is Santa Barbara County Ordinance 1927, establishing the County Department of Petroleum which regulates
"drilling, production and transportation of oil, including safety, sanitation and pollution control."' 1 26

Although this may appear to

some as a further fragmentation of regulatory authority, state decision-makers find it useful to draw on local knowledge and experience since often ". . . it is necessary to reflect the interests of local
1 27
governments in accommodating competitive needs.'

The haphazard and fragmentary approach to problems arising out
of the exploitation of the Continental Shelf, characteristic of the
Federal Government, while reflected in State governments (in California, at any rate) is, there, not as debilitating in its effects when
a disaster occurs. This is so for at least two reasons. First, greater
concern with local problems lends a perspective to the State authorities' views not enjoyed by their Federal counterparts; as a result of
the State's seriously considering local fears, 28 it has been better able
to anticipate problems before they arise. Second, its long legislative experience in areas likely to be affected by ocean pollution
problems-e.g., Harbor Pollution Control, Fish, and Game Regulation, and its comparatively long history of offshore drilling regulation 29 ---provides the State with some of the statutory "re125. D. Bickmore, Statement prepared for presentation before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 24, 1969).

126. Id. County of Santa Barbara, Calif. Ordinance, 1927 (date of adop-

tion not available).

REPORT, supra note 12, at 56.
128. "The States are subject to intense pressures from county and municipal levels, because coastal management directly affects local responsibilities and interests. Local knowledge frequently is necessary to reach
rational management decisions at the State level, and it is necessary to
reflect the interests of local governments in accommodating competitive
needs." ComzmssioN REPORT, supra note 12, at 56.
129. "Years have been spent by the States in working out legislation,
rules, and regulations, and details of procedure and practices governing the
geophysical work leasing methods and drilling problems involved in this
new and hazardous type of oil exploration. The States have established
and maintain departments, technical staffs, and experienced personnel to
handle these matters and supervise these activities. In other words, the
States are 'going concerns' in full and adequate operation." SENATE COMM.

127. CovnMssioN

ON INTERIOR AN

INSULAR

AFFAIRS, REPORT ON SUBMERGED LANDS

AcT, to

accompany S.J. RES. 13, S.REP. No. 133, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1953).
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sources" necessary to deal with reparation as well as to encourage
prevention.

In sum then, one wishing to proceed against a polluter is faced
with a plethora of laws, regulations, orders, and ordinances all of

which indicate a sensitivity to the harmfulness of pollution but none
of which provides much in the way of guidelines. The common law's
recognition of water pollution as a harm has been embodied in International Conventions and in Federal and State laws and regulations. Thus far, however, only the Department of the Interior
Regulation of July 21, 1969 provides a general damage remedy to
the private litigant injured by oil pollution. In all other cases the
pursuit of a remedy, or for that matter the prevention of pollution,
is left to governmental agencies enjoying considerable discretionary
power. If that power is not exercised effectively, and there is some
feeling that it has not been so exercised in the Santa Barbara
case,130 the bather or the fisherman or the beach front property
owner who has been the victim of oil pollution must pursue his
remedy by bringing a traditional nuisance action. That this approach can be exceedingly difficult to sustain as well as wholly inadequate in some cases is suggested in the sections following.
III.

LAWSUITS OCCASIONED

BY THE SANTA BARBARA DISASTER

Recognizing the fact that much of the law described in the preceding section is of little aid, those injured by the Santa Barbara oil
slick turned to their lawyers, who instinctively thought "Sue the
Bastards.' 131 That litigation is a "poor solution" and that the "citizens could smother in pollution before the questions are finally
adjudicated"'132 are the inescapable conclusions derived from what
follows. Nonetheless, given the present state of the law, this is the
only approach available to the injured parties. Also, the discussion
is worthwhile as the arguments raised in the various causes of ac130. Hill, Hole in Pollution Law, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1969, at 15, cols. 1
and 2.
131. This quotation is not included as an effort to be flippant; rather it
is the rallying cry of a dedicated group of conservationists, the Environmental Defense Fund, as propounded by their attorney, Victor J. Yannacone. See Rogin, All He Wants to Save is the World, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED,
February 3, 1969, at 24.
132. See Hill, supra note 130.

tion indicate the direction in which evolving tort doctrines must proceed if the legal system is to effectively resolve this new set of
conflicting interests. The following discussion shall proceed seriatim, dealing with related problems as they occur in each of the three
cases: California's claim against the United States, its claim against
Union Oil et al., and a private class action against Union Oil et al.
A.

State of California,et al.-Claimfor Damage or Injury

On February 18, 1969, the State of California, the City and County
of Santa Barbara, and the City of Carpenteria submitted a Claim
for Damage or Injury (Standard Form 95) to the Secretary of the
Interior. In it the claimants alleged damages "to property, water,
and the various types of personal property and the use thereof, and
to fish and wildlife along the coast of the Counties of Santa Barbara,
Ventura, and Los Angeles, State of California,"'8 3 caused by "the
leakage or spillage of oil or petroleum from or near the drilling platform located on O.C.S.P.-0241, Parcel 402, Platform 'A' into the adjacent waters."''8 4 The ad damnum of the claim is $500 million.18 5
One basis of the claim is a violation of the claimants' Fifth
Amendment rights: "It is claimed that the employees or officials
of the Department of the Interior have unlawfully deprived claimants either temporarily or permanently of the use of their property
without due process of law and for unlawful purposes."'1 8 0

It is also

claimed that the damage was caused by the Department's negligence in permitting offshore drilling without "adequate investigation to establish reasonable standards and safeguards for such drilling,' 137 by the local Oil and Gas Supervisor's negligence in failing to
inspect and supervise the drilling operations, 138 and by the conduct
of an ultra-hazardous activity. 139
This unusual mixture of a negligence action with an alleged violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights stems from the defendant's unique status as sovereign. The Federal Tort Claims Act
provides in part that the federal district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States ...

for injury or loss of property ...

caused by

133. State of California, et al., Claim for Damages or Injury-Standard

Form 95 (Government Form and attached memorandum submitted to Secretary, Department of the Interior, February 18, 1969).
134. Id. 113, at 2.
135. Id. 1 6, at 3.
136. Id. 1 5, at 3.
137. Id. 6, at 3.
138. Id. at 3-4.
139. Id. at 4.
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the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private

with the law
person, would be liable to the claimant in acordance
of the place where the act or omission occurred.140
There is an exception which will be important in the Santa Barbara case: the preceding shall not apply to(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
government, whether or not the disagency or an employee of the
cretion involved be abused.1 41
Aside from the question of negligence and its attendant problems
(to be considered momentarily), this statute raises at least three obstacles which the plaintiffs must overcome if they are to succeed.
First is the question of whether the United States, if it were a private person, would be liable. It is difficult to conceive of a private
person carrying on functions analogous to the United States' in
Santa Barbara. The private owner of oil and gas rights who conveys a lease to an oil company is in some ways similar. The law is
not clear as to whether the private lessor would be liable either for
the torts of his own "negligence" in granting the lease or in failing
to inspect. Summers asserts, without citing authority that "[1] andowners and their oil and gas lessees, in the exercise of their privileges
to take oil and gas, have common-law and statutory duties not to
drill and operate oil and gas wells in such locations and in such a
1 42
manner as to constitute a public or private surface nuisance."'
The reason for the lack of cases holding the landowner liable is that
invariably the oil company itself is the obvious, if not always the
most desirable, defendant. There is reason to believe, however,
that the United States will not be able to win on this point regardless of whether or not a private person would be liable in the same
circumstances. Since the important Texas City Disastercase, which
held that the failure of the Coast Guard to fight a fire was outside
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
142. W. Summs, 1 THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS § 65 (1954). It is true
that the reader is referred to chapter 21 of the same treatise but that material is concerned exclusively with the Operator's Liability. See Id., voL 4.

the Act because there was no analogous liability of private persons
for such failure,143 the courts have tended to disregard this basis of
denying relief. With the ever increasing role of the Government in
all aspects of life, the cases where private persons would not only be
free from liability but also would never even engage in the particular activity are manifold. Thus, in a case involving a faulty
lighthouse which resulted in the plaintiff's suffering damage, the
argument that providing a lighthouse was a "uniquely governmental function" was rejected. 1 44 While granting offshore oil leases is
surely a "uniquely governmental function," it is probably no more
so than providing lighthouses or, as in another case, air traffic con45

trol.1

The second problem the plaintiffs in Santa Barbara must overcome is that raised by the statute's providing that the negligent act
must result in the Government's being liable in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred. The granting
of leases probably occurred in Washington, D.C.; the failure to inspect occurred on the high seas. Thus, the Government's granting
the lease must be a basis of liability under Washington, D.C. law
and the failure to inspect must be a basis of liability under California law as it was on August 7, 1953.146 Finding authority for either of these propositions will not be easy.
The third problem arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act involves the above-quoted exception: if the granting of leases, failure to inspect, etc. were in performance of a discretionary function
or duty, there will be no liability. The cases have refined this rule
by drawing a distinction between the "planning level" and the "operational level." For example, the decision whether to install a
lighthouse is "planning" and discretionary with no liability arising
for failure to do it; once it is installed, however, improper maintenance is "operational" and negligence at this level will render the
Government liable. 147 In the Santa Barbara case, then, the decision to grant leases is probably not actionable, having been made
at the planning level; failure to inspect, on the other hand, would
be a basis for liability if such'failure can be shown to have been
negligent.
143. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).

144. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
145. United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1965), aff'd

in 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
146. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 STAT. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1333
(a)(2)(1953).
147. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra note 144.
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As to the whole question of negligence there is some "evidence"
that the Department of the Interior officials failed to exercise due
care: former Secretary of the Interior Udall has said that he
bore the responsibility for the decision permitting the oil drilling in
the Santa Barbara Channel. "Mr. Udall said that the question of
tighter regulations governing the drilling had never come up,
though geological conditions in the Santa Barbara area were known
to be unstable."'1

48

Another item which may be "evidence" of neg-

ligence is the assertion that the Geological Survey allowed the
lessee to "cut some corners" in drilling the fateful well.1 49 Finally,
the allegation in the claim that the Regional Oil and Gas Supervisor
failed to inspect the drilling operations may be "evidence" of negligence. 50 Whether these items are truly evidence of negligence in
a legal sense is a question only a court can decide.
A more fundamental question that also must be decided by a
court is that of causation: did these acts or omissions by the Government's servants, assuming arguendo that they can be proven,
proximately cause the "blow-out"? Also, there is the question of
foreseeability: would a prudent Government servant reasonably
foresee that these acts or omissions might lead to a disaster of the
magnitude of that occurring off Santa Barbara? 15 ' The consideration of this problem will doubtless involve the weighing of masses
of expert testimony and even if causation can be shown after all, the
court may balk: it is highly unlikely that a court will render a decision implying that a Government regulatory body is liable for the
acts of the regulated industry which occur when the former is lax in
its surveillance of the latter. Such a holding would put an impossible burden not only on the Department of the Interior but also on
the hundreds of other Government agencies charged with regulat,
ing private industrial activities.
148. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
149. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1969, at 24.

150. State of California, et al., supra note 133, fI 6, at 3-4.
151. At the same time that Secretary Hickel promulgated the new Regulation (30 C.F.R. 250.42 (b) in 34 FED.REG. 2503, Feb. 21, 1969), "the Interior
Department released texts of its field reports and supporting documents
relative to the 'blow-out' of Santa Barbara Channel well no. A-21.
"The Reports cover the circumstances and procedure during the drilling
period and subsequent efforts to control the well during the oil leakage
period from January 28 to February 7." Department of the Interior,
News Release, Feb. 17, 1969. These Reports (unavailable at this writing)
may serve to answer many of the questions raised herein.

A final point should be noted with respect to the plaintiffs' action
for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. It will be recalled
that the notion of an ultra-hazardous activity was raised in the
claim. The contention that the Government should be strictly liable, with no need for a showing of negligence, was specifically rejected in the Texas City Disaster case. In that case the Supreme
Court resorted to the legislative history of the Act to show that it
requires a "negligent act" and that the word "wrongful" in 1346 (b)
"was not added to the jurisdictional grant with any overtones of the
absolute liability theory. '152 Since then some arguments, with support from lower courts, have been made to the effect that the Government can be absolutely liable; 15 3 it is doubtful, however, that
there would be such a finding in the Santa Barbara case, especially
in view of dollar amount of the damage claim and the fact that it
was not the Government but its lessee that was engaging in an
ultra-hazardous activity.
An alternative theory which the claimants obviously had in mind
is one which somehow draws on the federal Bill of Rights. That is,
the United States Government, in sanctioning the offshore drilling
which resulted in the destruction of property belonging to the people of California, unlawfully deprived the claimants of their property without due process of law. This theory is unusual for two
reasons. First, unlike the usual Fifth Amendment taking, it was not
the government which did the taking; it was the oil companies. 164
Since the Government had put its imprimatur on the drilling, it was,
in effect, a party to the taking in much the same way that judicial
enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant was held to constitute "state action" as proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 155
152. Dalehite v. United States, supra note 143, at 45.
153. See, e.g., Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 24 FED. BAR J. 139 (1964), 25 FED. BAR J. 5 (1966). The district court in
Adams v. T.V.A., 254 F. Supp. 78 (E.D. Tenn. 1966), held the defendant to
strict liability for concussion damage from blasting, where it found that the
"discretionary" exception did not apply.
154. This point is discussed by Professor Munro in his article on aircraft
noise as a "taking". The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) did not arrive at ".... a basis for determining the entity
(person, corporation, airline, port authority or other governmental unit)
upon which liability would be ultimately fastened." Munro, Aircraft Noise
As a Taking of Property, 13 N.Y.L. FoRUm 476, 483 (1967). The fact that
overflight can amount to a "taking" in the constitutional sense does not
make the government an insurer nor does it make private carriers agents of
the government. Id. at 485-6. See Gardner v. County of Allegheny, 382 Pa.
88, 114 A.2d 491 (1955). When the public agency exercises control, however,
it is liable based on an "agency in control theory." Id. See Chromster v.
City of Atlanta, 99 Ga. App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731 (1959).
155. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Secondly, it represents a significant departure from the usual Fifth
Amendment case. There, arguments generally revolve around the
issues of whether the compensation was just or whether the "taking" was for a public purpose. Here, there has undoubtedly been a
"taking": as the claimants point out, there are fewer fish, birds,
etc. in the area than there were before. In addition to this, the
very granting of the oil leases resulted in a kind of "taking." The
erection of oil rigs and the mere threat of pollution lowered property values in the area and this was all done without compensation.
Whether these "takings" were for a public purpose is debatable; a
court would likely uphold the Government's action here, it being
not "for a public purpose," but "in the public interest." This is but
another example of the Government's dispensing largess and coincidentally compromising the rights of individuals. 156

As to the

"taking" occasioned by the oil spill, there was surely no due process
of law. Thus, the case lacks "due process" not because someone engaged in an "evil" or "unfair" practice, nor even in a practice which
"shocks the conscience" as in the usual violation of a Bill of Rights
guarantee. Rather the taking was the result of the Government's
carelessness in performing an otherwise inoffensive governmental
function.
For the reasons raised in the discussion of negligence, it is doubtful that a court of law is going to validiate this theory of liability.
The Government is continually dispensing and taking all kinds of
property and it is often done without due process of law in the
sense that the persons from whom the "property" is being taken
have no recourse to traditional dispute-settling machinery. The
people of Santa Barbara could not have obtained a hearing to air
the merits of their contention that the oil leases constituted a taking of their scenic domain. The reason for this-the argument
might run-is that, while a few have lost their "property," the
greater public interest has been served thereby and a hearing
would be superfluous.
In sum, then, California's claims against the Department of the
Interior, while probably having little chance of success, do serve to
dramatize the fact that a Government agency has taken a rather
156. This is a variation on a theme expounded by Prof. Reich in The
New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).

casual approach to its duty of regulating the offshore oil industry.
Interior's flurry of activity immediately following the Santa Barbara disaster demonstrates a general recognition of the need for
new rules and regulations in order to keep pace with the advance
of technology. Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment theories suggest that the time is nigh for a reconsideration of the Government's
role with respect to this "new property": clean water, uncluttered
horizons, and unfouled beaches. 15 ' It is time, too, "to recognize
that 'the public interest' is all too often a reassuring platitude that
covers up sharp clashes of conflicting values, and hides fundamental choices."'15
B. State of California,et at. v. Union Oil Company, et al.
At about the time the Claim for Damage or Injury was filed with
the Department of the Interior, the same claimants brought a class
action in the California Superior Court "on behalf of themselves
and all other public entities and agencies of the State of California
similarly situated."' 59 The defendants named were Union Oil Company, operator of the Federal lease on which Platform "A" is situated, its partners in the Channel oil drilling venture-Mobil Oil
Corporation, Gulf Oil Company, and Texaco, Inc.-and the drilling
contractor, Peter Bawden Drilling, Inc., plus 500 unknown defendants.
The complaint poses several theories of liability; but, before any
court will consider the question of liability there are at least two
threshold matters which must be decided: the question of jurisdiction and the question of what law applies.
1. Jurisdiction
Usually a case such as this would be clearly within the in personam jurisdiction of the California Superior Court since it has
physical power over all the parties to the action, their being residents and/or doing business in California. This case involves a
complexity, however, in that the complained of activity occurred,
in part at least, on the outer Continental Shelf and in the waters of
the high seas, areas not necessarily within state jurisdictional
boundaries. Thus, does California have subject matter jurisdiction?
157. For a thoughtful discussion of this theory as it applies to noise

pollution occasioned by aircraft overflights see Munro, supra note 154.
158. Reich, supra note 156, at 787.
159. State of California, et al. v. Union Oil Co. et al., Complaint for
Damages (No. 85494, filed in Superior Court of the State of California for

the County of Santa Barbara, Feb., 1969).
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act' 6 0 provides as follows:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of
the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom,
to the same extent as if the outer ContinentelShelf were an area of
exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State .... 161
[Emphasis supplied.]
The italicized words raise the inference that the outer Continental
Shelf is an area of exclusive jurisdiction. That Congress may
rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in Federal courts has been
long recognized. 6 2 The general rule, however, is that although a
Federal court may have jurisdiction over a particular matter, State
courts continue to have jurisdiction where they have exercised it in
the past unless Congress has expressly or by necessary implication

vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal court.

63

The problem here is that the State courts have not in the past
exercised jurisdiction over the outer Continental Shelf. In a
sense, then, the above-quoted language suggests a situation not unlike original Federal question jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction has
been held not to constitute a bar to similar jurisdiction in the State
courts. For example, the Bankruptcy Act, although vesting exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings in bankruptcy in Federal District Courts, does not bar plenary suit in State courts by the
bankruptcy assignee to recover a preference, even though issues of
Federal Law would be raised in the State suit. 64

160. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 STAT. 462, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-43 (1953).
161. Id. 1331(a) (1).
162. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429 (1867). Cf., HAMILTON,
FEDERALIST No. 82; "I mean not therefore to contend that the United States
in the course of legislation upon objects intrusted to their direction, may
not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to
the federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient;
but I hold that the State courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of
the opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded
by the further acts of the national legislature, they will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth."
163. Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898).
164. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 136 (1876).

The question remains, however, as to whether the outer Continental Shelf Lands Act contains an express grant or necessarily
implies exclusive Federal jurisdiction. The Act does not contain
an express grant: an express grant, as in the case of Federal enclaves, unequivocally states that "[t]he District Courts of the
United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States."1 5
Thus, if there is exclusive jurisdiction it must arise by implication. Other sections of the Act and its legislative history suggest
that the concern of the draftsmen Was to insure that no state would
make claims to the resources of the outer Continental Shelf or assert fiscal claims against activities conducted thereon. 0 0 Since the
causes of action occasioned by the Santa Barbara oil slick do not
impinge in any significant way upon matters of exclusive Federal
concern it is likely that the State court has concurrent jurisdiction; this seems especially true in view of the fact that the major
portion of the damage was suffered by the State of California or its
citizens.
The purpose of this discussion is to emphasize a peculiarity of
the Federal system which may have profound implications for the
litigants in the Santa Barbara cases. It has been hypothesized that
if an action for patent infringement is brought in a state court and
then removed to the Federal court, it should be dismissed. This
might be called "Hart's Hypothesis" since it was a favorite topic of
discussion in the late Professor Henry M. Hart's course on Federal
Courts. If the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act vests exclusive
jurisdiction in the Federal courts, then the cause of action brought
by the State of California, et at. against Union Oil will suffer the
same fate because Federal jurisdiction in removal is derivitive.
Naturally, the oil companies would like to see a similar result in
the Santa Barbara cases. If Professor Hart's Hypothesis is correct,
the defendants can delay indefinitely. 10 7
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
166. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (3) and 1953 U.S. CODE CONG.

AND ADw.
NEws 2177.
167. Another delaying tactic which the defendants have employed is
provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 which provides that a United States court may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except, inter
alia, where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. Such an injunction was applied for in order to stay proceedings against Union Oil for violation of the
State Harbors and Navigation Code and the Fish and Game Code (see
supra note 121 and 123). The basis of the injunction was that the "blowout", being a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction, should not be dealt
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The question of jurisdiction over the damage done in the waters
of the high seas is another matter. First, the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone1 68 provides that the coastal
State may exercise "control" over the zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea; 169 the Santa Barbara spill occurred
well within this zone.' 70 "Control" is limited, however, to that
amount necessary to prevent infringement of the coastal State's
I... customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its
territory to territorial sea."'1'7 The oil spill may be construed as an
infringement of the United States' sanitary regulations, but because
its power to prevent is limited to infringements within the territorial sea, it seems to follow that jurisdiction can only be exerted
over that portion of the infringement harming the territorial sea.
This, then, would leave a polluter free to pump oil into the high
seas-even within the contiguous zone-and be liable only for that
fraction of the damage occurring in the territory or territorial sea
of the coastal State.
This view is supported by one of the few cases dealing with the
outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Guess v. Read, wherein the
court held that "[i] t is only for 'that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and Artifical Islands and fixed
structure erected thereon' that the State law applies. . [T]his
does not include the sea above the subsoil and seabed and does not
72
1
include the air above the sea.

Since this is the only pertinent law and since President Truman
chose to leave the freedom of the high seas unimpaired in his 1945
Proclamation, it appears as though there is no law applicable to
that portion of the pollution occurring in the high seas and thus,
no one has jurisdiction over such portion. 73
with at all in State courts. This information was obtained from a personal conversation with John W. Warnock, attorney at Schramm, Raddue
and Seed, attorneys for Hall et al.
168. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
169. Id., art. 24, § 1.
170. "The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
Id., § 2.
171. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous zone, supra note

168, § 1(a).

172. 290 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1961) cert. den. 368 U.S. 953 (1962).
173. PRESENTMr
PROc. No. 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 59 STAT. 884 (1945).

Article 24 of the Convention on the High Seas 1 74 suggests an opposite conclusion: its requirement that States draw up regulations
"to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil. . . resulting from the exploitation . . . of the seabed and its subsoil . . ."
would seem of necessity to confer jurisdiction on the concerned
State.
2. Theories of Liability
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege five causes 75 of action:
1) because of the defendants' engaging in an ultra hazardous activity, plaintiffs suffered damages proximately caused thereby in
the amount of no less than $500 million; 2) defendants negligently
carried on drilling operations and as a proximate result plaintiffs
suffered damage in the amount of no less than $500 million; 3) defendants permitted emissions of oil to escape from their well and
thereby damaged, polluted, and contaminated plaintiffs' lands, waters, fish, wildlife, and personal property in the amount of no less
than $500 million; 4) defendants negligently caused the destruction of various birds, fish, mammals, mollusks, and crustaceans protected by the laws of California; 17 6 5) contrary to the laws of California, 77 defendants negligently permitted oil to be deposited into
the waters of the State and thereby put plaintiffs to great expense (no less than $10 million) in cleaning up the oil so deposited.
These five causes of action can be reduced to three theories of liability. The two statutory causes (4 and 5) really involve the question of negligence; that is, if plaintiffs can prove the defendants
were negligent (and assuming the destruction of wildlife and pollution of waters can be proven), liability should follow. So, these two
causes should proceed under the same theory of liability as 2,
negligence in drilling.
Since negligence is the usual basis of liability for tortious conduct
arising out of the oil drilling business, 78 the plaintiffs must show
174. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13

U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.

175. This enumeration of causes of action is a paraphrase of the allegations contained in 36 paragraphs of the complaint. See supra note 159.
176. CAL. Fisa & GAME CODE § 2014 (West 1958) (erroneously cited
and quoted in Complaint).
177. CAL. HAR. &NAy. CODE.
178. "The escape of deleterious substances from oil wells, pipe lines,
tanks and other equipment used in producing, processing, transporting,
marketing and refining crude petroleum and petroleum products, due to a
variety of accidents and defects in equipment and occurring at all stages
of production and distribution, has resulted in damages to almost every
conceivable type of real or personal property." Keeton and Jones, Tort
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that the defendants departed from the conduct of a hypothetical
prudent operator and that the defendants could have reasonably
foreseen that such a departure might result in damage like that
which did occur. The problem is that it will be exceedingly difficult
to show the conduct of a prudent operator and then show how the
defendants departed from this standard. Such showing will involve voluminous expert testimony of a very technical nature. The
aforementioned departures from prescribed procedures will, of
course, be very relevant to the negligence theory. On the whole,
however, negligence is a difficult basis upon which to establish liability in this kind of technical field. Thus, the plaintiffs have also
pleaded alternative bases: strict liability and a variation on tres17 9

pass.

These two remaining theories of liability are similar and therefore can be discussed together. The comparatively recent development of the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous
conditions is embodied in the leading case of Rylands v. Fletcher,8 0 where the water in a reservoir broke through into the
unused shaft of a coal mine and flooded the adjoining mine of the
plaintiff. There, the court held that "the person who for his own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and,
if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage
which is the natural consequence of its escape."''1
California has approved this principle in a case remarkably appropriate for the present discussion, Green v. General Petroleum
Corp. 8 2 In that case, the defendant driller was held to be liable
for damage from a "blow-out" despite an express finding of due
care in the conduct of his operations.
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise, lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known conditions, and with knowledge that injury may result to another, proLiability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1956). See
id. note 1 for illustrations.
179. This variation on trespass is often referred to as nuisance. See
supra note 63.
180. Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd
in Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, affd in Rylands v. Fletcher,
[1868] L.R. 3 H.L. 330.

181. Fletcher v. Rylands, [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279.
182. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).

ceeds, and injury is done to the other as the direct and proximate
consequence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does
the act and causes the injury should, in all fairness, be required to
compensate the other for the damage done. The instant case offers
a most excellent example of an actual invasion of the property of
one person through the act of another. The fact that the act resulting in the "blow-out" was lawful and not negligently done does not,
in our opinion, make the covering of respondents' property with oil,
sand, mud, and rocks
any less an actual invasion of and a trespass
83
upon the premises.
While neither Rylands v. Fletcher nor Green specifically require
that the defendant's activity be ultra hazardous for him to be held
strictly liable-focusing rather on the relation of the activity to its
surroundings' 84-the plaintiffs here have also included this notion
of dangerous condition. There are several possible reasons for the
plaintiffs' following this tack. Most American jurisdictions apply
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher "only to the thing out of place,
the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a
'natural' one where it is."'1 5 The fact that by California law, "[t] he
drilling of an oil well is an ultra hazardous activity because it necessarily involves the risk of serious harm to lands, waters, fish, wildlife, and personal property of others,"'' 8
renders the inclusion
of this theory of liability a prudent pleading tactic.
There may be a more subtle reason for its inclusion. The Restatement of Torts, having accepted Rylands v. Fletcher, has limited
it to an "ultra hazardous activity."' 8 7 On the one hand, a plaintiff
hard put to show that the activity was ultra hazardous would prefer that the court not follow the Restatement rule; on the other
hand, if he can prove "ultra hazardous activity" and if the court
adopts the Restatement approach in its entirety, the plaintiff then
may be able to take advantage of the retatement's non-recognition
of the "act of God" defense. 8 8 That is, the Restatement puts a
heavy initial burden on the plaintiff; once this burden is met, the
defendant will be liable absolutely.
183. Id. 205 Cal. 328, 333-34, 270 P. 952, 955 (1928).
The court also
notes that the discovery and production of oil is a legitimate business,
"The present case does not arise from either the conduct of a nuisance
per se, or from an inevitable calamity or act of God .... " 205 Cal. at
333, 270 P. at 954.
184. PRossER, § 77, at 527.
185. Id.
186. "On August 7, 1953, the law of the State of California held the
activity of drilling an oil well to be an ultra hazardous activity which
subjects the actor to liability regardless of whether the actor was negligent." State of California, supra note 159, at f 16.
187. AmRiucR
LAW INSTITuTE, RESTATEMENT OF Tim LAW OF TORTS §§ 519,
520 (1938).
188. Id. §§ 510, 522. The Tentative Draft, No. 12 at 142 cites as authority
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This aspect of the doctrine of strict liability is especially important in the Santa Barbara case. Undoubtedly, the defendants will
claim the "blow-out" was an act of God; if this fails, they will
claim the damage to the territorial sea and shore was an act of
God, since presumably "God" could have as easily blown the oil in
the opposite direction, out to sea. Thus, if the Restatement approach is adopted, the "act of God" defense ought to be of no aid.18 9
But even if the court does not adopt the Restatement approach,
Green itself suggests that the defendants will have some difficulty
sustaining an "act of God" defense. Even though the "blow-out" in
the Green case occurred with no preliminary indications that it was
imminent, and even though the well was the "wildest" ever encountered by the drillers in their experience, the court was left unimpressed.
Assuming [these contentions] to be so, the fact does not materially
affect the consideration of the case, for we are not now dealing with
an unforeseen event or such a happening as, amounting to an 'act
of God,' serves to relieve from responsibility for injury occasioned
thereby. In this case, the primary inquiry leads to but one conclusion, and that is that the construction of the well, an enterprise
lawful
in itself, was the direct and proximate cause of the gas blowout.190

Here, however, there is a factual difference that may be crucial:
in the instant case the "blow-out" occurred in an offshore drilling
operation and this is technologically different from shore-based operations. The following discussion may serve to elucidate the
difference. One theory of how the disaster occurred is as follows:
the shaft that was drilled to the oil pool had a metal "casing" extending down 239 feet from the seabed, the shaft remaining unsheathed below that point; oil surged up the shaft and normally
would have continued up to the level of the casing where it could
be controlled. Instead, the oil encountered an uncharted fault
line before reaching the level of the casing and followed it, rather
than the shaft, to the ocean floor.' 19 Assumedly, this same chain
Vredenburg v. Behan, 33 LA. ANx. 627 (1881), Baker v. Sneli, [1908] 2 K.B.
825, 77 L.J.K.B. 1091 both of which would appear to be distinguishable.
PaossER, § 78, at 537, note 63. See also Nichols v. Marshland, [1875] L.R.
10 Ex. 255.
189. See generally,PROssER, § 78, at 536-7.
190. Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 331-32, 270 P. 952,
954 (1928).
191. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 2E (schematic drawing).

of events could occur on land; however, on land when the oil
reached the surface it would form a pool which would be somewhat
confinable. In this offshore operation, though, the oil, being generally lighter than water, flowed from the ocean floor to the top of
the water in an uncontrollable fashion. If then, this was, as one
Government geologist is reported to have speculated, a "completely
freakish" occurrence, 192 then perhaps it was an "act of God" in the
Green sense and a defense to the cause.
While these facts may serve to free the drillers from liability, the
spectre of further uncontrollable and unpredictable pollution suggested by these same facts strongly point to the advisability of disallowing drilling in this area until technology can more readily insure that such a disaster will not reoccur.
3. Alternative Theories
The foregoing discussion of theories of liability is not exhaustive.
For example, the common law private nuisance action was not
specifically pleaded. Private nuisance involves the defendant's unreasonable use of his property in such a way as to cause substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff's land.
This theory is generally regarded as putting heavy requirements
upon plaintiffs: they must show (1) a substantial interference with
the use and enjoyment of their land, (2) that the defendant's conduct was either (a) intentional and unreasonable or (b) unintentional and actionable under the rules governing liability for
negligent, reckless or ultra hazardous conduct, and (3) that the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of the interference.' 03
While this might all be easily established in the Santa Barbara case
its inclusion would be redundant-negligence, recklessness, and ultra hazardous conduct having already been pleaded. Furthermore,
nuisance is generally invoked in those cases where a continuing industrial activity causes damages to plaintiffs; 9 4 the question of reasonableness is determined by weighing the social utility of the defendant's activity and the suitability of this activity to its location
In Santa Barbara
against the gravity of harm to the plaintiff.10
192. Id., col. 6.

193. See Current Legislation, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9
COLLEGE IND. & COM. L. REv. 712, 716 et seq. (1968).
194. See Cyr v. Town of Brookfield, 153 Conn. 261, 216 A.2d 198
(1965); Southern Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Chapman, 103 Ga. App. 773,
120 S.E.2d 651 (1961).
195. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Curran Carbonizing & Eng'r Co., 279 S.W.2d 211,
218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), where the court stated that persons living in cities
must submit without recourse to annoyances and discomforts incident to
BOSTON
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the "nuisance" was an isolated event rather than one arising out of
the normal conduct of an industrial enterprise. To plead nuisance
in these circumstances might unnecessarily require the court to
deal with the extension of a tort doctrine in a case already fraught
with numerous new and unfamiliar issues.
Public nuisance might have been pleaded by the State of California et al. This kind of action can be brought only by a public
entity and only when the activity affects the rights of the public
as a group. Otherwise, the above observations on private nuisance
are applicable and the public entity faces the same difficulties as
does the private litigant. 96
Finally, under the nuisance rubric, there is statutory nuisance
or nuisance per se. If there is a statute declaring an act to be a
nuisance, then the plaintiffs need only show a violation of the statute to recover. There does not appear to be any statute specifically
declaring pollution of the sea resulting from offshore oil drilling to
be a nuisance. A statute prohibiting oil pollution, however, would
seem to imply as much, because such pollution is, inter alia, a nuisance. This resembles the tort doctrine of negligence per se where
violation of a statute designed to protect a certain class of persons
give the members of that class a cause of action against the violator
and his negligence is presumed.
As can be seen from the preceding discussion, the areas of overlap between nuisance, trespass and strict liability are considerable.
It has been suggested that the courts are moving toward a merger
of the doctrines. 19 7 In this sense, the Santa Barbara plaintiffs
should not be faulted for their failure to plead the nuisance theories.
municipal life because commercial enterprises are necessary for the prog-

ress of the public at large.

196. For a thoughtful discussion of the various types of nuisance see
Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollution,
10 ARIz. L. REV. 107 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Porter).
197. Id. at 118. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86,
342 P.2d 790 (1959). See also Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance and Strict Liability, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1959); Lester, Nuisance-As a "Taking"
Property, 17 U. MukmI L. REV. 537 (1963); Yerke, The Law of Nuisance in
Oregon, 1 WLLAiMEv
E L.J. 289 (1960); Comment, A Trend Toward Coalescence of Trespass and Nuisance: Remedy For Invasion of Particulates,
1961 WASH. L. Q. 62 (1961).

One other rather interesting theory of liability remains: that
premised on the antitrust laws. Two recent articles by the same
authors conclude that concerted industrial reaction to pollution control efforts or measures is not violative of the antitrust laws.10 8
The same authors duly note the seemingly different view of the
Antitrust Division as evinced by its suit, United States v. Automobile ManufacturersAss'n.,199 alleging that the major automobile

manufacturers agreed not to install anti-pollution devices. Such
an agreement is said to constitute a "conspiracy in restraint of
trade. ' 20 0

Similarly, it might be argued that the damage occurred

at Santa Barbara as a result of the various defendants' agreeing to
seek permission to deviate from the prescribed operating regulations pertaining to offshore drilling.20 1 At a higher level of generality, one economist has suggested that industry efforts to maintain
the artificially high price of domestic oil through government subsidies is a direct cause of the disaster; ".

.

. oil leasing in the

Santa Barbara Channel would not have taken place in the absence
' 20 2
of the subsidy program.
The discussion of alternative theories serves to elucidate two
points. One is that while the legal system as a whole has not kept
pace with technological advances and their attendant problems, the
theoretical concepts for framing complaints do exist. The second
point is that even though there is language available for the drafting
of pleadings, at least one other obstacle remains: the reluctance of
courts to extend old doctrines into new problem areas. To predict
how courts will respond to these arguments is an exceedingly
hazardous undertaking. "Nonetheless the potential advantages accruing to those who can overcome the difficulties involved make it
an avenue of attack on localized ... pollution problems that should
not be overlooked in the shadow of ... pollution control stat198. Verleger and Crowley, Air Pollution, Water Pollution, Industrial
Cooperation and the Antitrust Laws, 4 LAND ANm WAT L. Rzv. 475, 485
(1969) and Pollution: Regulation and the Antitrust Laws, 2 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 131,140 (1969).
199. Civil No. 69-75-JWC, C.D. Calif. noted in Verleger and Crowley,
supra note 198, 4 LAND Am WATER L. REv.at 486, n.34.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1. A similar argument has been made by the plaintiff
in Yannecone v. Montrose Chemical Co. et al.: DDT manufacturers are
alleged to have set prices in order to prevent competition from other, less
harmful, pesticides. Par. 8(e) of plaintiff's verified Complaint (October
13, 1969).
201. See TIm, Feb. 14, 1969, at 24.
202. W. Mead, The System of Government Subsidies to the Oil Industry,
paper presented before the Sub. Comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the

Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (March 11, 1969), at 18.
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utes.1203 This assertion becomes an imperative when the statutory
framework is as inadequate as its been shown to be in the Santa
Barbara situation.
C.

Hall et al. v. Union Oil et al-PrivateClass Action

Finally, mention should be made of the private class action
brought against the oil companies.2 04 This is important because it
is the kind of suit that will become increasingly popular when large
numbers of people suffer pollution damages which are not worth
prosecuting individually. In this case there are really four classes:
Seacoast Marine Corporation, representing the pleasure boating
suppliers, sellers and users; 20 5 Dorothy Ferre, representing the
users of the public beaches; 20 three property owners; 20 7 and
Harrison Hall, representing the local fishermen. 20 8 The theories of
20 9
and negligence.2 10
liability again are ultra hazardous activity
This case differs from the preceding, however, in that a finding
of strict liability would greatly assist the plaintiffs. These four or
five private persons might find it extremely difficult to establish
the oil companies' negligence in conducting a technical operation
such as offshore drilling. How are these plaintiffs, who presumably know little about offshore drilling, going to show that the defendants failed to exercise the ordinary care of a reasonably prudent
operator? On the other hand, strict liability may be too harsh, especially since the fault could be that of some other entity, e.g., the
government inspector. Perhaps the fairest approach in these cir211
cumstances would be to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The fact that the oil drilling was under the defendants' sole control,
it is presumed that the operators were negligent. This presumption
can be overcome by the defendants' showing that, it was in fact
the fault of another, e.g., the government inspector. The advantage
203. Porter,supra note 196, at 119. The omitted word is "air," but the
quotation is equally applicable to oil pollution.
204. Hall v. Union Oil Co. Amended Complaint for Damages (No. 69422-cc, filed in U.S.D.C., Cent, Dist. of California, February, 1969).
205. Id., lst-6th Causes of Action, at 1-6.
206. Id., Seventh-Ninth Causes of Action, at 6-8.
207. Id., Tenth-Twelfth Causes of Action, at 8-9.
208. Id., Thirteenth-Fifteenth Causes of Action, at 9-11.
209. See, e.g., id., First Cause of Action, q V, at 2.
210. See, e.g., id., Second Cause of Action, 11H, at 3.
211. See PROSSER, supra note 63, §§ 39-40.

of this approach is that it shifts the burden of making a highly technical showing (of non-negligence) to the party having the requisite resources.
The bringing of a class action raises certain problems which the
plaintiffs have undoubtedly anticipated. Perhaps the most significant is the problem of notice: 212 all members of the class must
be notified of the pending action so that they might either make
an appearance or exclude themselves from the class. When a class
includes hundreds of thousands of people-e.g., "residents of the
coastal area of Southern California . .. who in the past and plan

in the future to derive particular pleasure from the contemplation
and use for sport and pleasure of the public beaches .

. . ."

The

cost of mail notice becomes staggering, assuming a complete membership list can be established. Of course, in a disaster the magnitude of Santa Barbara's notice is less of a problem since nearly
everyone is apprised of the pending lawsuits.
D.

Damages

The preceding three suits amount to claims for damages aggregating over $2.36 billion. 213 The concern of this section is to identify some aspects of these damages and to discuss the problem of
evaluation.
By now, most are aware of the more well-publicized harm occasioned by the oil spill. By February 6, a 2-inch thick layer of crude
oil had already accumulated on the Santa Barbara beaches: the
harbor and wharf shops had to be closed after oil had stained the
hulls of the 750 boats moored there and reached such proportions
as to constitute a fire hazard. 214 By February 9, 191 dead birds had
already been found while 450-500 men worked in teams of 50 men on
the mile of beach in an effort to clean up the mess.2 15 As late as
Civ. P. 23 (c) (2).
213. The Claim for Damages or Injury filed with Secretary of the Interior
was for $500 million; that against Union Oil Co. et al. was for $560,006,000.
The private class action was for $1.3 billion.
214. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 1, cols. 2-5.
215. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 77, col. 4. One commentator has suggested that the most dramatic effect of oil pollution is its toll of water birds.
"Pollution in this case begets more pollution. The water birds, too, are
links in a chain; many are scavengers, patrolling our beaches as natural
sanitation squads. Without them, beaches would become inapproachable
because of the stench; ship's garbage would float on the waves and
clutter the harbors; foulness and disease would choke our inlets and bays."
Rienow & Rienow, The Oil Around Us, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1967 (Magazine), at 24, 110. While this account may also be dramatic, it is worthy of
consideration, especially when contrasted with the remark inaccurately
212. FED. R.
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February 27, patches of oil were still washing up on Southern Cali' 216
fornia beaches as far as 70 miles from the site of the "blow-out.
Two birds and a porpoise, all dead from the oil, were found in
Venice, California; 217 and by March 14, it had been established that
three dead whales found on a beach near San Francisco had died
as a result of the oil.218
Depending on one's sensitivities, the above account may or
may not be moving or impressive; but, in any case, these losses
seem to amount to far less than $2 billion. But, the problem with
this kind of tragedy is that most of the damage is far-reaching, longlasting, and inconspicuous.
The damage is far-reaching because of a characteristic of oil on
water: it spreads fast and covers vast areas. 219 Within 10 days
after the "blow-out" the resultant oil slick was reported to have
covered 800 square miles. 220 An oft-cited British study reports
that 15 tons of oil (a negligible amount by current pollutions
"standards") "dropped into a calm sea can cover 8 square miles in
less than a week, and that oil slicks can be traced for many hun'221
dreds of miles."
Further, the effects of oil pollution of the sea are long-lasting.
Another well-known study has shown that a Baja California beach,
polluted by 2,000 tons of oil in 1957, still suffered the damaging
effects after eight years. 222 A Government sponsored study of the
attributed to the President of Union Oil: "I'm amazed at the publicity for
the loss of a few bird." See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1969 at 32 cols. 2-6 and
(advertisement) at 31.
216. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at 14 col. 7.
217. L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1969, at 26, col. 2.
218. "Dr. Robert Orr of the California Academy of Science confirms
after examining three dead whales which washed up on beaches near San
Francisco that the whales were killed by the Santa Barbara oil slick.
Marine biologists fear that dozens more whales will die in the next few
weeks as more than 8000 Pacific grey whales migrate north past Santa
Barbara on their way to Arctic waters [sic]." Boston Globe, Mar. 14, 1969,
at 2, col. 1.
219. Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44
DENVER L. J. 400, 403 (1967).
220. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
221. Rienow & Rienow, supra note 215, at 24; noted in Nanda, supra
note 219, at 403.
222. North, Tampico, An Experiment in Destruction, 13 SEA FRoNTrIMs
212 (1967), reported without citation by Clive Manwell of the Marine

Torrey Canyon disaster predicted that it would take at least five
223
years before many of the coves covered by oil fully recovered.
Finally, most of the damage from oil pollution of the sea is inconspicuous because it works in subtle ways and on tiny organisms.
The living organisms of the sea exist in an immensely complex and
delicate balance. The following descriptive passage is exemplary:
Just as land plants depend on minerals in the soil for their
growth, every marine plant, even the smallest, is dependent upon
the nutrient salts or minerals in the sea water. Diatoms must have
silica, the element of which their fragile shells are fashioned. For
these and all other microplants, phosphorus is an indispensable
mineral. Some of these elements are in short supply and in winter
may be reduced below the minimum necessary for growth. The
diatom population must tide itself over this season as best it can.
It faces a stark problem of survival, with no opportunity to increase,
a problem of keeping alive the spark of life by forming tough protective spores against the stringency of winter, a matter of existing
in a dormant state in which no demands shall be made on an environment that already withholds all but the most meagre necessities of life. So the diatoms hold their place in the winter sea, like
seeds of wheat in a field under snow and ice, the seeds from which
the spring growth will come.
These, then, are the elements of the vernal blooming of the sea:
the 'seeds' of the dormant plants, the fertilizing chemicals, the
warmth of the spring sun.
In a sudden awakening, incredible in its swiftness, the simplest
plants of the sea begin to multiply. Their increase is of astronomical proportions. The spring sea belongs at first to the diatoms and
to all the other microscopic plant life of the plankton. In the fierce
intensity of their growth they cover vast areas of ocean with a living blanket of their cells. Mile after mile of water may appear
red or brown or green, the whole surface taking on the color of the
infinitesimal grains of pigment contained in each of the plant cells.
The plants have undisputed sway in the sea for only a short time.
Almost at once their own burst of multiplication is matched by a
similar increase in the small animals of the plankton. And this is
the spawning time of the copepod and the glassworm, the pelagic
shrimp and the winged snail. Hungry swarms of these little beasts
of the plankton roam throught he waters, feeding on the abundant
plants and themselves falling prey to larger creatures. Now in the
spring the surface waters become a vast nursery. From the hills
and valleys of the continent's edge lying far below, and from the
scattered schoals and banks, the eggs or young of many of the bottom animals rise to the surface of the sea. Even those which, in
their maturity, will sink down to a sedentary life on the bottom,
spend the first weeks of life as freely swimming hunters of the
plankton. So as spring progresses new batches of larvae rise into
the surface each day, the young of fishes and crabs and mussels
and tub worms,
mingling for a time with the regular members of
224
the plankton.
Biological Association in Plymouth, in 1 ENVmONMENTAL ScizcE
TECHNOLOGY, 273 (1967), noted in Nanda, supra note 219, at 403.
223. N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 77, col. 1.
224. R. CARsoN, THE SEA ARouND Us, 29-30 (1951).

AND
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When oil destroys or renders inedible the surface plankton, this
process is upset; "then life chains become death chains which can
destroy the sea life depending upon them.... ,,225 A University of
California botanist has predicted that a drastic ecological imbalance
could occur in Santa Barbara because of the oil slick, the result being that plants will prosper at the expense of animals. 226 This
ecological imbalance can become a problem in a profound way. In
the short run, oil pollution can spoil many of the living resources of

the sea that man now uses for food; already, emulsified oil has sunk
to the bottom of Santa Barbara Channel killing lobsters, mussels,
clams, and abalones. 227 But, in the long run, the damage could be
225. Rienow and Rienow, supra note 215, at 110.
226. TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23. "The oil and chemicals used to disperse
the Torrey Canyon slick are thought to have disturbed the chain of marine
life by killing the plankton and other small organisms, small fish and
shell fish. While attention has focused on dead birds, naturalists are
most concerned about the effect on marine life. Birds can fly from the
scene, but marine life is trapped."
Mr. Teague [U.S. Congressman representing the Santa Barbara
area] expressed similar sentiments about the ecological effects of
the oil leak, agreeing that in many ways a 'dead sea' had been
created-at least for a time-off the California Coast.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, at 77, col. 1. But see, the results of a recently
completed study:
Nearly all communities inspected were healthy and showed no
adverse effects of oil. Birdlife was an outstanding exception.
Birds suffered due to interference of absorbed oil with normal
functions of the plumage, not as a result of toxicity. Many organisms, however, did not seem to be affected by thick coatings of
oil substances or tar (particularly shelled forms).
With the exception of birdlife, ecological damage by the oil spillage
appeared to be light. Even if all the dead organisms observed
in our surveys (including corpses obviously not attributable to
destruction by oil) were considered, the Channel biota is still in a
healthy, vigorous, and reasonably normal state. Various biologists
who have also made observations recently in the Channel thus
far appear to agree with out conclusion.
L. JONES, C. MITCHELL, E.ANDERSON, AND W. NORTH,A P
INARY EVALuATION OF ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN Oit SPIL.T INTHE SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL 4 and 5 (unpublished paper multilithed at W.M. Keck Engineering
Laboratories, Calif. Institute of Technology; support from the Western Oil
and Gas Association is acknowledged). The authors, some of whom also did
the Tampico study (see supra note 222), also point out that, ".

.

. if oil

seepages continue in the Santa Barbara Channel, ecological effects may
become prevalent. Perhaps our observations at Rincon on March 10 are
indictive of losses resulting from long term exposures. Beach cleaning
efforts may thus benefit the marine life as well as improve esthetic conditions." Id. at 6.
227. TIME, Feb. 14, 1969, at 23.

devastating: as man turns more and more to sea resources for food
and water, the lasting effects of pollution on the sea's ecology may
become painfully vivid. Thus, there may be more at stake here
than the naturalists' concern with maintaining the stability of
ocean ecology.
The question that remains after all of this is the hardest of
all: how does one put a price on the damage done by oil pollution? Even if one could evaluate the living resources which were
destroyed by the oil and even if one could evaluate their highly
speculative future value, how does one set a price for a clean, as opposed to an oily, beach? Or, for that matter, how does one evaluate
a sunset over the blue Pacific as distinguished from a sunset over a
slightly reddish-brown Pacific with the horizon rudely "decorated"
with oil drilling platforms?
The answers to most of the questions raised above will be a long
time coming-only after months, perhaps years, of litigation. There
is, however, a lesson to be drawn from all this. Common sense suggests several conclusions: first, disasters like that at Santa Barbara should not happen; second, if they do occur, the person or persons responsible should be required to pay for the damage;
third, if the Government falls down in its job and is, therefore, partly
responsible, it should not "get off free"; and most importantly,
such a disaster should never occur simply as a result of poor planning or inadequate supervision by some Government "bureau." In
short, one is brought to what is intended to be a central thesis of
this study: if man is going to exploit the resources of the Continental Shelf and if the Government, as "sovereign," is going to play
a role in this exploitation, it must insure that the legal machinery is
capable of resolving the disputes which will inevitably arise. This
is the lesson that Santa Barbara teaches; but, because it is Santa
Barbara, and not some vulgar, less enchanting spot, there is a
deeper lesson that is suggested by the following question: Is the
continued growth of the economy, the unimpeded and ever-increasing growth of the industrial system, in short, the final conquest and
"development" of every last frontier regardless of "social cost"-is
this the summun bonum of American society? Some few aspects
of this question will be discussed in the following concluding
section.
CONCLUSION

The preceding sections have traced the development of several
branches of legal doctrine, culminating in their "collision" in Santa
Barbara. While the Santa Barbara disaster alone adequately dem-
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onstrates the legal system's incapacity, or at least its clumsiness, in
handling catastrophic occurrences arising out of the exploitation
of the outer Continental Shelf, the oil spill raises more fundamental
questions impinging on notions of life-quality in an industrial society. This analysis necessarily involves a look at the political,
economic, and social aspects of the Santa Barbara disaster.
It has been said that it is now fashionable to be against pollution.
Unfortunately, such has not always been the case. In years past,
courts and legislatures, when confronted with the conflict between
industrial progress and environmental quality, have chosen the
former. As recently as 1966, Congress "emasculated" the Oil Pollution Act of 1924228 by making "grossly negligent, or willful spilling"
the basis of liability for pollution.229 In 1968, the Congress failed to
pass an antipollution statute.2 30 In 1969, however, the House of
Representatives' first piece of domestic legislation was H.R. 4148,
passed on April 16, by a vote of 392-1.231 This bill, which became
Public Law 91-224232 on April 3, 1970, provided that offshore oper23 3
ators must cleanup any negligent discharges.
The obvious explanation of this change in the attitude of the
legislators is politics. Whereas in the past there was no political
mileage to be made out of being "antipollution," it is now a popular
stance for an elected office-holder to take. Even if "antipollutionism" did enjoy wide popular support heretofore, the well-known
political muscle of the oil industry, as well as that of other industrial
polluters was considered to be too much to oppose. It took disasters like Torry Canyon and Santa Barbara before the public out2 34
cry was such as to stimulate Congressional action.
228. Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 STAT. 604, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964),
as amended Nov. 3, 1966, PuB. L. 89-753, Title II, § 211 (a), 80 STAT. 1252.
229. Id. See note 81, supra.
230. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1969, at 78, col. 2.
231. N.Y. Times, April 17, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
232. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, 84 STAT. 91.
233. Id., § 12(f) (1). By making only negligent or willful dischargers liable for pollution, the Act is weaker in effect than the new Outer Continental Shelf Operating Regulations which make lessees strictly liable. 34
FED. REG. 2503-04 (February 21, 1969), amendment to 30 C.F.R. 250.42. See
discussion cited at note 97, supra.
234. "The House bill is a direct outgrowth of three oil pollution incidents
in recent years: The Wreckage of the tanker Torrey Canyon off the coast
of England in March, 1967, the grounding of the tanker Ocean Eagle off

Despite the fact that the *oilindustry has been subdued for awhile
on this issue, H.R. 4841 points up additional problems. It is, as the
saying goes "too little, too late." The Santa Barbara Channel had
to be polluted before such a bill was forthcoming; and even then, it
departs from the usual preventative approach of legislation and attempts to plug a presumed hole in the common law. Even absent
such a bill, it is a fair assumption that ultimately the claimants in
Santa Barbara or in any similar circumstances will collect on their
negligence actions. 235 The problem with both the bill and litigation
is that they are remedial: no amount of money damages is going
to restore Santa Barbara to status quo ante.
Therefore, the legislature's view must be to prevention. "Preventive measures include, among other things, a thorough overhaul
of the regulations under which drillers operate, a greater participation in the kind of research that will enable oil companies to better
predict geologic faults, fissures, or weak spots. Perhaps most important of all, the government must exhibit firmness in refusing
waivers to drillers.12 6 This, of course, is merely the "nuts and
bolts" of prevention. The larger question the legislature must
grapple with involves its first recognizing and then balancing the
various competing interests. Here, they might be framed as environmental quality versus development of a vital natural resource.
Since in this case the resouce is oil, in which the government has
such a pervasive interest, the economics of offshore drilling is an
inescapable factor in the legislature's equation.
The United States collected $603 million in bonuses for the Santa
Barbara Channel leases alone and could expect millions more in
royalities. 23 7 Naturally, in these days of budget deficits and soaring costs, increased revenues provide a powerful impetus to the
Government to lease its submerged lands. On the other side of the
balance sheet, it looks as if there is little money to be made by keeping Santa Barbara clean, especially if the government escapes all
Puerto Rico in March, 1968, and the oil spill from an off-shore drilling rig
in California's Santa Barbara Channel last winter." N.Y. Times, April 17,
1969, at 1, col. 3.
235. The author has been informed that the Union Oil litigation has
been settled with the claimants in the private class action, the measure of
damages being that which would obtain had the defendants been found
guilty of negligence. Personal correspondence from John W. Warnock, of
Schramm, Raddue and Seed, attorneys for plaintiffs, November 7, 1969.
236. Clingan, Oil Pollution, U.S. NAVAL INStEtUTE PROCEEDINGS 64, 65
(May, 1969).
237. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 1, col. 3. "(L]ast year [the government] made $1.6 billion in rentals, royalties and bonus payments from the
Santa Barbara concession."
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liability for its role in such disasters. Given the facts that the government stands to gain much by the offshore drilling program and
will lose little, it is likely that the balance will tip in favor of industry. Furthermore such benefits as do derive from offshore
drilling accrue to the whole country (increased general revenues,
strengthened national defense posture, etc.), while any ill effects
are local.
The government, however, also has the duty to try to foster the
optimum allocation of society's resources. This means that the decision on whether or not to allow drilling must not be based simply
on royalties, tax revenues, and the consumer's need for petroleum
products; these are the private costs and benefits of an industrial
enterprise. Optimum resource allocation occurs where marginal
social benefits and costs are equal.2 38 Social costs and benefits necessarily include externalities: these are the costs (pollution being
a favorite example) and benefits (e.g., "spin-offs" from space technology) borne and captured by society generally. Since the government's foremost duty is to provide for the general welfare, it
must also consider externalities in its regulation of industrial activity.23 9
Santa Barbara illustrates these points in an emphatic way. One
thoughtful student of the problem has suggested that were it not
for government subsidies and other regulatory favors, offshore
drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel would not be economically
feasible. 240 It is argued that the social cost of oil production is
The
$3.42 per barrel while the social value is only $2.10241
cost to society aggregates $4 billion annually, 242 which is to say that
the externalities of offshore drilling render it uneconomic. The
company executive, in deciding whether to engage in offshore
238. W. Mead & P. Sorensen, Externalities in Ocean Mineral Resource
Development, at 10 (undated paper done at the Department of Economics,
University of California, Santa Barbara).
239. See, e.g., Buchanan and Stubblebine, Externality, 29 EcoNoICIcA
(1962); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 LAw & EcoN. (1960); MszEsuRiNG B.urrTs or Gov NmNT ImEsTvmIE's (R.Doftman ed. 1965); and
Prest and Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A. Survey, 75 Ecoolvac JOUNAL
126 (1965).
240. MEAD, supra note 202, at 18.
241. Id., at 15.
242. Id., M.A. Adelman, Efficiency in Resource Use in Crude Petroleum,
31 SOUTHERN EcoNo c JOURMAL 105 (1964).

drilling considers only internal costs (costs of material, labor, royalties, bonuses, etc.), weighing them against expected income; he
does not consider the externalities such as costs of cleaning polluted
waters or the costs to the bather who cannot use the beach because
it is besmireched with crude oil. Of course, the company executive
cannot be expected to include external costs in his calculations unless his firm is required to bear them.
There are at least two general ways in which the externalities of
offshore oil production can be internalized: through legislation or
through development of new applications of old principles of tort
law.
Three approaches to legislation have been suggested: (1) legislate an absolute prohibition on the enterprise, (2) legislate controls
which permit but regulate the enterprise, (3) use the taxing power
to internalize externalities. The first is inappropriate since it has
not been shown that offshore drilling is one of those activities, so
inherently undersirable and without redeeming social benefit, that
it ought not to be permitted anywhere. The third is a new and unusual approach but has a certain logical appeal: a tax equivalent
to the value of the externality would be levied on the enterprise,
with the company then free to behave in response to normal market forces, the tax being included as a cost of doing business. This
has the advantage of shifting the onus of difficult judgements
away from the regulatory body and putting it squarely on the po243
tential polluter.
It is the second approach, however, that is most familiar and thus
is the most likely of any to be adopted. This might be formulated
in the following manner: the Department of the Interior and other
bureaus would base decisions on sophisticated cost-benefit analyses,
with due regard for externalities, rather than on the simpler, traditional methods of setting priorities within budget constraints.
There is a precedent for such an approach: "The Flood Control Act
of 1936 adopted a crude and general criterion for federal funding
in cases in which '. . . the benefits to whomsoever they accrue are
in excess of the estimated costs. . "244 The problem, is that deci-

sions must be made by the appropriate regulatory bodies and as
such would be "planning"; under present law bad decisions would
not be actionable. Of lesser importance is the fact that this approach would only apply to regulated industries. Those not dependent upon governmental largess would be free to operate with243. Mead and Sorensen, supra note 238, at 15.
244. Quoted, id., at 11.
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out regard to externalities.
Further there is a major problem endemic in the entire legislative
scheme: the practical problem of getting Congress to adopt such a
"big picture" approach. While the oil companies have succumbed
to piecemeal controls, it is indeed unlikely that all regulated industries are going to stand by idly while Congress, with a single
stroke, either sharply increases costs or precipitately forecloses vast
areas of industrial expansion.
Because of the predictable obstacles to legislation, the alternative approach-litigation-will undoubtedly become an increasingly
important means of balancing the interests: environmental quality
and industrial growth. The Santa Barbara cases suggest how liti,
gators ought to proceed. The "class action" can be a useful tool
in applying the old doctrines of strict liability and nuisance. It is
not feasible for the individual suffering from air pollution to sue
every industrial polluter in the area for the injury to his eyes and
lungs; but it is feasible for "all similarly situated" to bring such an
action. Of course, the class action may create as many problems
as it solves: how are the numbers of the class to be notified, how
do the members of the huge class-e.g., the people of Los Angelesknow that they are being adequately represented, and how is the recovery to be dispensed? Because class suits are cumbersome, courts
are not receptive to them unless some broader issue of public policy
is envisioned. It has been persuasively argued that the "economics
of externality costs provide a suitable policy focus. ' 245 That is, only
damages (or, alternative, comprehensive governmental control) will
prevent "the insider, the oligopolist, the polluter, and the airline
from acting in a manner that exploits weaknesses in the market
24
system." 6
While this whole discussion of externalities may seem to be more
the province of economic theory than a fit subject upon which to
base law suits, economists argue that since externalities impinge
upon private property rights, the courts must concern themselves.247 The class action against unscrupulous directors, who by
245. Note, The Cost-InternalizationCase for Class Actions, 21 STANoRD
L.R. 383, 419 (1969).
246. Id.

247. See, e.g., Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am.
EcoN. REV. 90 n.3 (1967).

virtue of their positions profit at the expense -of shareholders, does
not differ conceptually from the class action against corporations
which profit at the expense of those citizens bearing the external
costs of production. Since there is a wrong, the law must provide
a remedy.
The problems with litigation should by now be obvious: the
possibility for endless delays, the complexity of the issues, and the
fact that litigation is remedial. This last problem deserves special
comment, especially in light of the preceding discussion of the
"class action." The theory underlying that discussion is that externalities can be internalized through litigation; .this can only
happen, however, after there have been enough successful suits
against polluters to persuade company executives of the prudence of
considering external costs in their decision-making. Initially class
suits will internalize external costs in a post facto manner: the
company must bear the cost of pollution but the pollution will
have already occurred. As has been seen, what is needed is a system of restraints which prevent pollution problems ever arising.
This will occur when company executives know for certain that
the costs of pollution arising from every project will fall directly on
the firm. Then, it can be assumed, either the activity will be foregone or the company will go to great lengths to insure that externalities are minimized in the same manner that it strives to mini248
mize internal costs.

In sum, then, two approaches to internalising the costs of pollution have been suggested. Whether either or both will come into
prominence is not clear; it is clear, however, that more than niceties
of legal and economic theory are at stake. Essentially the problem
reduces to a question of what kind of world people want to inhabit
in the 20th and 21st centuries. All are aware of the continuing
uglification of the environment and the efforts of a few to halt this
process. At present the law does not protect aesthetic values unless some other "real" value is also threatened. 249 " [A] esthetic
achievement is beyond the reach of the industrial system and, in
substantial measure in conflict with it."1250 Moreover, it has been
248. See N.Y. Times, April 10, 1969, at 1, col. 7, where it is reported that
several oil companies are suing the Federal Government because the new
liability provision (see discussion cited at supra note 91) renders exploitation of the Santa Barbara Channel oil field "economically and practically
impossible."
249. See Clyde, Legal ProblemsImposed by Requirements of Restoration
and Beautification of Mining Properties,13 RocKy MTN. Mixr. L. INST. 187,
at 219-21 (1967).
250. J. GALBArTH, THE NEw LDusrAmL STATE at 347 (1967). It is inter-
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asserted that as the year 2000 approaches the danger of irreversible
harm for the planet and mankind is ever increasing; this danger
is traceable to four interconnected threads which are cumulative in
their effects: wars of mass destruction, overpopulation, pollution,
and the depletion of resources.2 r' These problems seem to be far
beyond the pale of the present legal system. Indeed, it has been
2 52
suggested that only the state can protect aesthetic priorities.
Yet even in the face of these lofty goals there is a role for lawyers and the legal system. The old doctrines of strict liability and
nuisance through the vehicle of the class action provide the tools
whereby external costs can be internalized.
Admittedly, this alone is not going to stop the rape of the environment, but it is a step in the right direction. Further, as has
been maintained throughout, the legal system is at best clumsy in
dealing with problems such as those occurring at Santa Barbara. It
is for this reason that the nation's best legal minds must enter the
fray. It is often said that 'all
Street" has to become involved
with the problems of the indigent and the disadvantaged.2 5 3 Even
more importantly, "Wall Street" lawyers and their professional
esting to note that Galbraith begins his chapter, The Further Dimensions,

by contrasting two quotations.

".... for the first time since his creation man will be faced with
his.., permanent problem-how to use his freedom from pressing

economic cares, how to occupy the leisure, which science and
compound interest will have won for him to live wisely and agreeably and well."
John Maynard Keynes
Essays in Persuasion
"We should not fall prey to the beautification extremists who
have no sense of economic reality."
Fred L. Hartley
President of the Union Oil Company
Apparently the observation that Fred Hartley is "accident prone" was true
long before his recent misfortunes. MacDonald, Life with the Blob, 30
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 50, 57, April 21, 1969.
251. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1969, at 10, col. 1 (report on the work of Prof.
Richard A. Falk of Princeton University, who is directing research on a project devoted to world order in the 1990's).
252. J. GALBRATH, supra note 250, at 350. "There are many people who
would support the statement by Vice Admiral H.G. Rickover of the United
States Navy, that the government has as much duty to protect the land,
the air, the water, the natural environment of man against such (technological) damage as it has to protect the country against foreign enemies
and the individual against criminals...... " Clyde, supra note 249 at 230-31.
253. See e.g., Ardent Courtships,Ttvm, April 18, 1969, at 77.

counterparts throughout the country, must involve themselves in
the problems of environmental quality. They, like every one else,
must live on this planet. Is it not in their interest, then to devote
some of their talents to rendering the life-experience more than a
merely bearable one?

